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In the 1950s and 1960s, in many parts of the country, a professor could be
fired or never hired if he refused to denounce communism or declare loyalty to
the United States Constitution. The University of California (also referred to as
“UC”) system took the lead in enforcing such loyalty oaths. 1 These oaths were
challenged all the way up to the United States Supreme Court and were soundly
rejected, establishing the centrality of academic freedom and open inquiry on
the university campus. 2
So why are loyalty oaths making their resurgence in the form of mandatory
diversity statements? Universities have begun requiring faculty members to
declare fealty to a particular worldview and approach towards matters of
1. Robert G. Sproul, President of the University of California, drafted a loyalty oath to be
taken by all university staff in 1949. Robert Greenberg, The Loyalty Oath at the University of
California: A Report on Events, 1949–1958, FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT ARCHIVES, http://www.
fsm-a.org/stacks/AP_files/APLoyaltyOath.html. The following year, the State of California
adopted the Levering Act, which required all public employees to take a loyalty oath. Id.
Ultimately, twenty-six faculty members were dismissed, and thirty-seven others resigned in protest.
Id.
2. See infra Section I

Fall 2021]

In the Name of Diversity

517

diversity. 3 Campus diversity bureaucrats appear to miss the irony that these
statements are being deployed in the name of diversity. In another historical
irony, this trend has once again been spearheaded by the UC system.
While these diversity statements were initially conceived of as just an
additional factor to be weighed along with academic merit, teaching, and service,
the purpose and use of these statements has radically morphed over the past few
years. At some UC campuses today, a prospective professor who does not
produce a diversity statement that satisfies diversity bureaucrats will be excluded
from consideration without a review of any other aspect of his application. 4 The
rubrics that are being deployed engage in blatant viewpoint discrimination as
well as a viewpoint-based evaluation of the applicant’s research. 5 It is unlikely,
for instance, that an aspiring professor who shares the viewpoint of Chief Justice
Roberts that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race,” 6 would be hired. Can a university employ
such viewpoint-based criterion in its hiring process, or do the First Amendment
rights of individual professors foreclose such viewpoint-based discrimination?
This question turns on a long-standing debate that has divided courts and
academics across the country. Do professors have a personal First Amendment
right in their academic profession, or do free speech rights in academia extend
only collectively to academic faculty and departments? The Supreme Court’s
curtailment of public employee speech in Garcetti v. Ceballos has only
exacerbated this lingering tension. 7 This article begins with a recap of the
ongoing debate.
Many of the battles over faculty speech have traditionally concerned speech
or conduct in the classroom. Classroom speech raises difficult concerns over
whether the professor is speaking of his own accord or merely acting as an agent
of the University. 8 Other fights have concerned professors’ publications of
particularly controversial and offensive speech, such as when Ward Churchill
described workers in the World Trade Center as “little Eichmanns.” 9 These
cases have involved individualized assessments as to whether a particular faculty
member was likely to be disruptive or harmful to a university’s mission or
otherwise violated university protocol. 10 In these cases, the university has often,
but not always, prevailed.
3. See infra Section II.
4. See infra Section II.
5. See infra Section II.A.2.
6. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 US 701, 748 (2007).
7. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). See infra Section I.D.
8. See infra Section I.C.1.
9. Associated Press, Professor Fired After 9/11-Nazi Comparison, NBC NEWS (July 24,
2007), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19940243/ns/us_news-education/t/professor-fired-after-nazicomparison/#.Xdwk3FdKgzw.
10. See, e.g., Churchill. v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 285 P.3d 986, 991–92 (Colo. 2012).
The University of Colorado found that Churchill’s essay “did not engender imminent violence or
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The introduction of the mandatory diversity statement shifts the battleground
away from the classroom and away from the publication of particularly
controversial faculty speech towards systematic evaluation of viewpoint that is
largely unrelated to classroom activities and unrelated to whether the viewpoint
is expressed in a particularly offensive or divisive fashion. Surprisingly, thus
far scholarly attention to this new shift has been limited, 11 and public attention
muted, 12 although that appears to be changing. 13 This is perhaps because the
unduly interfere with university operations, constituted protected free speech and therefore could
not serve as the grounds for a for-cause dismissal of a tenured employee.” Id. at 992. However,
the University also investigated several other complaints of academic misconduct and found good
cause for his removal. Id. at 992–93.
11. Professor Erica Goldberg discussed diversity statements in an article published in the FIU
Law Review in the spring of 2019. See generally Erica Goldberg, ”Good Orthodoxy” and the
Legacy of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV. 639 (2019). However, Professor Goldberg’s discussion of
diversity statements is limited for two reasons. First, she does not focus on the specifics of how
these statements are being used (and her article was likely written before some of the most recent
and more troubling developments). Second, her article is not focused on the central question that
this article seeks to address, which is whether diversity statements impinge on the First Amendment
rights of faculty members. Professor Goldberg focuses instead on a more generalized issue of
compelled speech, rooted in the Supreme Court’s Barnette decision. Id. at 639–40.
12. Jeffrey Flier, the former dean of Harvard Medical School, sent out a tweet critical of
mandatory diversity statements in November 2018. See Colleen Flaherty, Making a Statement on
Diversity Statements: Former Harvard Dean’s Tweet Against Required Faculty Diversity
Statements Sets off Debate, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2018/11/12/former-harvard-deans-tweet-against-required-faculty-diversity-statements-setsdebate. He followed up this tweet with a column in the Chronicle of Higher Education in January
2019. See generally Jeffrey Flier, Against Diversity Statements, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 3,
2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Against-Diversity-Statements/245400. A response was
published a few days later. See generally Charlotte M. Canning & Richard J. Reddick, In Defense
of Diversity Statements, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/In-Defense-of-Diversity/245463. In 2019, a few opinion pieces and articles focused on the
use of these statements at the University of California, including an op-ed in the Daily Caller by
the author Daniel Ortner. See Daniel Ortner, Don’t Expect Diversity of Thought at University of
California, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 24, 2019), https://dailycaller.com/2019/09/24/ortner-diversityuniversity-california; see also Dan Walters, UC Faculty “Diversity Statement” Mandate a Political
Litmus Test, DESERT SUN: CALMATTERS COMMENTARY (July 28, 2019), https://www.desert
sun.com/story/opinion/columnists/2019/07/28/uc-faculty-diversity-statement-policy-litmus-testdan-walters-calmatters-commentary/1843207001/. Attention to the issue picked up in 2020. See,
e.g., Daniel Ortner, What is UC Davis Hiding About Its Use of Diversity Statements?, THE HILL
(Feb. 3, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/education/480603-what-is-uc-davis-hiding-about-itsuse-of-diversity-statements; Michael Poliakoff, How Diversity Screening at the University of
California Could Degrade Faculty Quality, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/michaelpoliakoff/2020/01/21/how-diversity-screening-at-the-university-of-california-coulddegrade-faculty-quality/#2c0a4bf41598; Robby Soave, Berkeley Weeded Out Job Applicants Who
Didn’t Propose Specific Plans to Advance Diversity, REASON (Feb. 3, 2020), https://reason.com/
2020/02/03/university-of-california-diversity-initiative-berkeley/.
13. Abigail Thompson, a vice president of the American Mathematics Society (AMS) and
Chair of Mathematics at UC Davis, wrote a column in the December issue of AMS Notices
critiquing diversity statements and labeling them a modern version of the loyalty oath. See Abigail
Thompson, A Word From . . . , 66 NOTICES AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 1778, 1778–79 (2019),
https://www.ams.org/journals/notices/201911/rnoti-p1778.pdf. Her column triggered a sharp
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extent to which universities plan to rely on these statements is only slowly
coming into focus. This article, therefore, breaks new ground by painting a
detailed picture of how diversity statements are being utilized. 14 It relies on
documents received from public record requests and conversations with
concerned faculty at UC schools and shows the extent these diversity statements
have become tools of viewpoint discrimination. 15 It identifies four key concerns
with the use of mandatory diversity statements: the overt role that race and
gender plays, the risk of viewpoint-based discrimination, the risk of viewpointbased evaluation of academic research, and the employment of a requirement
that professors take affirmative steps above and beyond their job duties to
promote diversity.
After laying this rather startling foundation, this article then advances three
closely related arguments concerning First Amendment protections for
university professors and prospective faculty against discrimination by their
academic institutions. 16 First, the use of diversity statements is symptomatic of
several shifting trends in higher education that threaten to undermine
professorial speech rights. These trends show why it is vital that courts
recognize a professor’s individual right to First Amendment protection at the
university and accord meaningful protection to that right. 17 Relatedly, these
same trends show why Garcetti cannot and should not be applied to a professor’s
speech outside of the classroom (including academic writing, conference
presentations, and purely extramural speech). 18
Finally, while a university must maintain the right to evaluate faculty
members based on their research contributions and their fit for a particular
department, a university crosses the line when it imposes the equivalent of an
ideological litmus test that excludes candidates who do not share a particular
viewpoint. 19 While courts have often been reluctant to interfere in the academic
selection process, the abuse of diversity statements shows a need for more
backlash, including calls to fire her or remove her from her position on the AMS. See, e.g., Chad
Topaz, Diversity Statements in Hiring, the American Mathematical Society, and UC Davis, QSIDE
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://qsideinstitute.org/2019/11/19/diversity-statements-in-hiring-the-americanmathematical-society-and-uc-davis/. On the other hand, hundreds of individuals signed a letter
supportive of Thompson as a rejoinder to her critics. See Scott Aaronson et al., Letter to the Editor:
Responses to “A Word from . . . Abigail Thompson,” AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 9 (Dec. 2019),
https://www.ams.org/journals/notices/202001/rnoti-o1.pdf. Abigail Thompson followed up with
an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal and the University offered a response. See Abigail Thompson,
The University’s New Loyalty Oath, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
the-universitys-new-loyalty-oath-11576799749; Renetta Garrison Tull & Gary S. May, UC Davis
Defends Its “Diversity Statements”, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ucdavis-defends-its-diversity-statements-11577392382.
14. See infra Section II.
15. See infra Section II.
16. See infra Sections III and IV.
17. See infra Section III.
18. See infra Section IV.
19. See infra Section IV.
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careful thinking about how universities can engage in content or viewpointbased distinctions. 20 This article accordingly argues that viewpoint-based
distinctions are particularly pernicious and should be subject to heightened
scrutiny. Even content-based distinctions must also be carefully evaluated to
ensure that they do not serve as a smokescreen for viewpoint-based
discrimination. The article ends by putting forward criterion that should be
considered when evaluating a university’s actions that potentially discriminate
based on content or viewpoint. 21 Mandatory diversity statements fall short of
each of these. Hopefully, these criteria will serve as a starting point for further
dialogue on this vital topic.
I. HISTORY OF PROFESSORIAL FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 22
A. Foundational Supreme Court Precedent 23
Protection for the free speech rights of teachers and professors got off to a
rather inauspicious start. 24 In Adler v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court
20. See infra Section IV.
21. See infra Section V.
22. The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech is distinguishable from academic
freedom. Scholars have debated extensively as to whether academic freedom is part of “the larger
class of rights enjoyed by citizens of a free society,” or whether it is solely based in “professional
autonomy” and professional norms. Henry Reichman, Academic Freedom and the Common Good:
A Review Essay, 7 AAUP J. ACAD. FREEDOM, 2016, at 2, https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/
Reichman_1.pdf (summarizing the debate at great length). The minimalist perspective suggests
that “academic freedom [i]s little more than a guild slogan that speaks to the desire of the academic
profession to run its own shop.” Id. at 3. (quoting STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION (2014)). Under this minimalist lens,
professors are not entitled to claim any right or entitlement to producing academic knowledge free
from institutional restraints. On the other hand, other scholars emphasize the individual and rights
protecting the nature of academic freedom and argue that “academic freedom is a category of
political freedom,” which protects “[t]he liberty to speak one’s mind.” David Bromwich, Academic
Freedom and Its Opponents, in WHO’S AFRAID OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 27, 27–28 (Akeel
Bilgrami & Jonathan R. Cole eds., 2015).
This article is primarily concerned with legal protections that exist to protect professorial speech,
rather than professional protections such as those extended by the AAUP. As will be discussed
shortly, the Supreme Court has folded the concept of “academic freedom” within the fold of the
First Amendment. Such legal protection of academic freedom is necessary and is becoming
increasingly necessary in light of trends in academia. In keeping with the Supreme Court’s pattern,
the phrase “academic freedom” will be used to refer to First Amendment freedoms.
23. Whole articles can and have been written about the Supreme Court’s historical treatment
of faculty speech and about how circuit courts have applied this precedent. This article is not
intended to comprehensively cover all these cases. Instead, this overview is focused on two themes.
First, the tension between the First Amendment rights of individual faculty members and academic
institutions, and second, what happens when academic institutions attempt to impose content- or
viewpoint-based restrictions on faculty members.
24. This “extremely narrow interpretation of the first amendment” hearkened back to
Blackstone’s Commentaries. William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First
Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, LAW &
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flatly rejected a challenge to a New York law that forbade any members of
“subversive groups,” such as the Communist Party, from becoming a teacher. 25
The Supreme Court explained that while the First Amendment protects an
individual’s “right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they
will,” the law did not guarantee a “right to work for the State in the school system
on their own terms.” 26 Accordingly, the school board did no harm to the First
Amendment when it forbade members of “subversive groups” from teaching. 27
Moreover, since “[a] teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom” and
“shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live,” the
school had the right to ensure “fitness and loyalty” and could base its
determination on “the organizations and persons with whom they associate.” 28
Justices Black and Douglas both voiced powerful and prescient dissents.
Justice Black voiced his concern that these kinds of laws “make it dangerous . .
. to think or say anything except what a transient majority happen to approve at
the moment” and his conviction that the First Amendment “rests on the belief
that government should leave the mind and spirit of man absolutely free.” 29
Justice Douglas explained that “[t]he public school is in most respects the cradle
of our democracy” and that freedom of speech and thought must be protected. 30
But when “suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line for fear of their jobs,
there can be no exercise of the free intellect.” 31 Such a result is contrary to “the
pursuit of truth which the First Amendment was designed to protect.” 32
Within just a few years, Justices Black and Douglas would find themselves in
the majority. 33 The reconsideration of Adler began with a case only loosely
related to public education that nevertheless gave the Court a chance to deploy
a more robust interpretation of the First Amendment. In Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of an individual who
refused to answer questions asked by the New Hampshire Attorney General as
part of an investigation into left wing organizations in the state. 34 One of the
lines of questioning concerned Sweezy’s lecturing at the University of New
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 79, 83. It was also pithily expressed by then Judge Oliver
Wendell Holmes: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(Mass. 1892).
25. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 489, 496 (1952).
26. Id. at 492.
27. Id. at 489, 493.
28. Id. at 493.
29. Id. at 496–97 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 510.
32. Id. at 511.
33. The shift in perspective on First Amendment issues was not limited to academic freedom
but instead impacted most aspects of First Amendment jurisprudence. See generally Van Alstyne,
supra note 24, at 91.
34. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 238, 244–45, 255 (1957) (plurality opinion).
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Hampshire. During his class, Sweezy had allegedly extoled the virtues of
socialism and declared that it was “inevitable in America.” 35 A plurality of the
Supreme Court held “that there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner’s
liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression—areas in
which government should be extremely reticent to tread.” 36 The Court extolled
the virtue “of freedom in the community of American universities” and “the vital
role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth.” 37
While in Adler the Court found that teachers must conform to expected norms
of “fitness and loyalty,” in Sweezy the plurality instead extoled the necessity of
open intellectual inquiry: “Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding;
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.” 38 Indeed, the plurality
emphasized that “[t]o impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation.” 39
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence, also set out one of the enduring
definitions of academic freedom:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail “the four essential freedoms” of a
university—to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study. 40
A few years later in Shelton v. Tucker, the Supreme Court invalidated an
Arkansas statute that required all teachers in public schools to file affidavits
providing the name and address of all organizations they belonged to or
contributed to within the prior five years as a prerequisite to employment. 41 The
Court once again extolled the importance of academic freedom, emphasizing
that “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools.” 42 Any “unwarranted inhibition
upon the free spirit of teachers . . . has an unmistakable tendency to chill that
free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and
practice; it makes for caution and timidity in their associations by potential
35. Id. at 260 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 250.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 263. (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN AND THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN
UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10–12 (Albert van de Sandt Centlivres et al. eds., Johannesburg:
Witwatersrand Univ. Press, 1957)).
41. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480, 490 (1960).
42. Id. at 487.
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teachers.” 43 Because the disclosure requirement put “pressure upon a teacher to
avoid any ties which might displease those who control his professional destiny”
that was “constant and heavy,” it was an “impairment of constitutional
liberty.” 44
Justice Frankfurter dissented from the decision, and in his dissent one can see
early echoes of the debate between the speech rights of individual educators and
academic institutions that is at the center of this article and the battle over
diversity statements. Justice Frankfurter explained that in his view academic
freedom “in its most creative reaches, is dependent in no small part upon the
careful and discriminating selection of teachers.” 45 Academic hiring decisions
“must be based upon a comprehensive range of information” and are “a matter
of fine judgment.” 46 Because information about a teacher’s associations might
be relevant to determining his or her dedication to the job or his or her overall
qualifications for the position, Justice Frankfurter refused to invalidate the
statute. 47 But he noted that using the information gathered “to further a scheme
of terminating the employment of teachers solely because of their membership
in unpopular organizations” would be unconstitutional if proven. 48 So for
Justice Frankfurter, deference was due to academic institutions so long as they
did not discriminate against a particular viewpoint.
The trend towards more and more robust protections of academic freedom
peaked 49 a few years later in Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 50 Professors at the
University of Buffalo were required to either sign a certificate or declare under
oath that they had never been part “of any society or group of persons which
taught or advocated the doctrine that the Government of the United States or of
any political subdivisions thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force,
violence or any unlawful means.” 51 Several professors either resigned, were
fired, or faced imminent termination at the expiration of their contracts. 52
43. Id. (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
44. Id. at 486–87.
45. Id. at 495–96 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 496.
47. Id.
48. Id. Justice Harlan also wrote a separate dissent. He similarly emphasized that the
information sought was legitimate and that it was “impossible to determine a priori the place where
the line should be drawn between what would be permissible inquiry and overbroad inquiry in a
situation like this.” Id. at 498 (Harlan, J., dissenting). According to Justice Harlan, schools should
be given wide range to inquire and to take all meaningful factors into account. See id. at 498–99.
49. This review of the Supreme Court’s cases concerning loyalty oaths and investigations into
subversive elements is not comprehensive, and there are several other decisions which “proved to
be quite uneventful in the long run.” Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 112–13. Professor Alstyne’s
article is far more comprehensive than space permits me to cover here.
50. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
51. Id. at 592. Full time professors were required to sign the oath, while a part-time lecturer
was only required to answer the question under oath. Id.
52. Id.
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The Supreme Court brusquely rejected application of Adler, noting that
“pertinent constitutional doctrines have since rejected the premises upon which
that conclusion rested.” 53 It then emphasized that the New York law was vague
and could encompass “mere advocacy of abstract doctrine” or “mere expression
of belief.” 54 As a result, the law would dramatically chill teaching and research
endeavors, for “[i]t would be a bold teacher who would not stay as far as possible
from utterances or acts which might jeopardize his living by enmeshing him in
this intricate machinery.” 55 The law would therefore “stifle ‘that free play of the
spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice . . . . ‘” 56
The Supreme Court then unambiguously embraced the notion of academic
freedom: “Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned.” 57 Academic freedom “is therefore a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom,” which “is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’” 58 The Court’s
rhetoric went even further: “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative
selection.’” 59 The Court further explained that “[b]ecause First Amendment
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area
only with narrow specificity.’” 60 Under that standard, New York’s loyalty oath
could not withstand scrutiny. 61
Keyishian has rightfully been described as a landmark decision and an
“important rite of passage” for academic freedom. 62 After Keyishian, “[t]he
measured protection of academic freedom from hostile state action had become
a settled feature of first amendment law.” 63

53. Id. at 595.
54. Id. at 600–01.
55. Id. at 601. See also id. at 604 (“When one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose
him his position, one necessarily will ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . .’”) (quoting Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
56. Id. at 601 (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)).
57. Id. at 603.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d,
326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
60. Id. at 604 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963)).
61. Id.
62. Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 114; see also Elliot Friedman, ”A Special Concern”: The
Story of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 38 J. COLL. & U.L. 195, 195 (2011) (“The Court’s decision
in Keyishian v. Board of Regents did more than vindicate its plaintiffs. It also fundamentally altered
First Amendment law.”).
63. Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 115.
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The Supreme Court also expanded the rights of students in public schools and
universities in a similar fashion by relying on substantially similar rhetoric to
which it used to defend the right of teachers and professors. 64 Hence, in Tinker
v. Des Moines, the Supreme Court closely linked the two and declared that “First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, are available to teachers and students,” because “[i]t can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.” 65
Up to this point, all of the Supreme Court’s cases discussed have concerned
speech-adverse policies being implemented by governments or school boards.
In such cases the Supreme Court has continued to offer robust protection of the
First Amendment and academic freedom. For instance, in Board of Education
v. Pico, the Supreme Court invalidated a school board’s decision to ban several
books from school libraries. 66 The Court, in a plurality opinion that was largely
joined by Justice Blackmun in his concurrence, emphasized that it had “long
recognized certain constitutional limits upon the power of the State to control
even the curriculum and classroom.” 67 While school boards “possess significant
discretion to determine the content of their school libraries,” they could not
exercise that power “in a narrowly partisan or political manner,” because “[o]ur
Constitution does not permit the official suppression of ideas.” 68 In this case,
the interest of students to have access to books and the interest of teachers to use
and encourage reading of those books aligned perfectly. But the picture is far
less certain when the right of individual faculty members and the right of
academic institutions clash. 69
64. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972) (“The College, acting here as the
instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views
expressed by any group to be abhorrent.”); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 US 263, 273–74 (1981) (asking
whether student groups can be excluded from the public forum “because of the content of their
speech”).
65. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 US 503, 506; see also Van Alstyne,
supra note 24, at 120.
66. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 875 (1982) (plurality opinion).
67. Id. at 861.
68. Id. at 870–71 (emphasis in original). Justice Blackmun in his concurrence expressed his
view that while the state had no “affirmative obligation to provide students with information or
ideas,” nevertheless “certain forms of state discrimination between ideas are improper” and that
“the State may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that
idea for partisan or political reasons.” Id. at 878–79 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in
original). The key for Justice Blackmun was that “school officials may not remove books for the
purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when
that action is motivated simply by the officials’ disapproval of the ideas involved.” Id. at 879–80
(emphasis in original). In other words, while the school could “choose one book over another” for
a variety of reasons, such as which books were more relevant to the curriculum, it could not act
based on viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 880. Schools could not engage in “an intentional attempt
to shield students from certain ideas that officials find politically distasteful.” Id. at 882.
69. The tension between institutional and individual academic freedom has been described as
“seriously incompatible and probably ultimately irreconcilable.” Walter P. Metzger, Profession
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There were early signs—such as Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Shelton—that
even stalwart defenders of free speech would be conflicted when faced with a
clash between the rights of individual professors and their academic
institutions. 70 An even more surprising divergence from free speech protection
of teachers came from Justice Black just a year after Keyishian. The majority
decision in Epperson v. Arkansas concerned the Establishment Clause, which
the Court concluded prohibited the teaching of creationism in the classroom. 71
Justice Black expressed his grave concern that the majority decision would
“thrust the Federal Government’s long arm . . . further into state school
curriculums.” 72 Justice Black emphasized that states should be “absolutely free
to choose their own curriculums for their own schools so long as their action
does not palpably conflict with a clear constitutional command,” and that the
state had the “power to withdraw from its curriculum any subject deemed too
emotional and controversial for its public schools.” 73 Justice Black was
surprisingly dismissive of a teacher’s ability to freely introduce controversial
topics, declaring, “I am also not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school
children takes with him into the classroom a constitutional right to teach
sociological, economic, political, or religious subjects that the school’s
managers do not want discussed.” 74
In contrast, Justice Stewart in his separate concurrence emphasized that while
a state would be free “to decide that the only foreign language to be taught in its
public school system shall be Spanish,” it would not “be constitutionally free to
punish a teacher for letting his students know that other languages are also
spoken in the world.” 75 By penalizing a teacher for merely “mention[ing] the
very existence of an entire system of respected human thought,” a state “would
clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free communication contained in the
and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1267
(1988). In a seminal article, Dean Mark G. Yudof described “three . . . faces of academic freedom,”
and explored how the “personal autonomy face of academic freedom” can come into tension with
the “institutional face.” Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 LOY. L. REV. 831,
832, 834, 851-53 (1987).
70. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
71. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107–09 (1968).
72. Id. at 111.
73. Id. at 112–13.
74. Id. at 113–14. Justice Black’s position is best contextualized as part of his general
skepticism of First Amendment rights in the public school setting. The following year, Justice
Black wrote a dissenting opinion in the Tinker case warning:
that if the time has come when pupils of state-supported schools, kindergartens, grammar
schools, or high schools, can defy and flout orders of school officials to keep their minds
on their own schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness
in this country fostered by the judiciary.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 518 (1969). As already discussed,
Justice Black was far more protective of the rights of professors and students in institutions of
higher education. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
75. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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First Amendment.” 76 So, Justice Stewart would have deferred to the state’s
determination of its schools’ curriculum and pedagogy, but not at the expense of
forbidding a teacher from expressing a different perspective. 77
More than a decade after Keyishian, the Supreme Court issued its most
detailed defense of institutional academic freedom, notably in the context of the
University of California’s efforts to craft an affirmative action program. In
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court found that
a university is protected by the First Amendment in its desire “to make its own
judgments as to education[,] includ[ing] the selection of its student body.” 78 The
Court relied on Justice Frankfurter’s explication of the “four essential freedoms”
from Sweezy, and emphasized that these freedoms are “of transcendent value to
all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.” 79 The Court, therefore,
found that the university had a First Amendment interest in creating a campus
where students could be exposed “to the ideas and mores of students as diverse
as this Nation of many peoples.” 80
But the Supreme Court also sounded a necessary note of caution: “Although
a university must have wide discretion in making the sensitive judgments as to
who should be admitted, constitutional limitations protecting individual rights
may not be disregarded.” 81 The “fatal flaw” in UC’s “preferential program is its
disregard of individual rights” and individualized consideration. 82 Bakke thus
stands for the principle that deference to institutional concerns for diversity is
limited by constitutional restraints that protect individual liberty.
In several other decisions, the Supreme Court continued to affirm the
institutional academic freedom rights of universities. For instance, in Regents
of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, the Court upheld the University of
Michigan’s decision to drop a student from a program rather than allow him to
retake a test he had failed. 83 As annotated by one scholar, the Court declared:
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely
academic decision . . . they may not override it unless it is such a
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate
that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise
professional judgment. . . . Added to our concern for lack of standards
(there are none obviously provided by the Constitution or elsewhere
according to which judges or juries can say what norms of academic
competence are suitable or unsuitable for any university as such) is a
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
79. Id. (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) and quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
80. Id. at 313.
81. Id. at 314.
82. Id. at 320.
83. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 215, 227–28 (1985).
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reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of . . . educational institutions
and our responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom, “a special
concern of the First Amendment.” 84
In these cases, and others, academic freedom becomes a shield intended to
prevent the judiciary from engaging in intensive and intrusive review of the
actions of the institutional university.
In his concurrence in Widmar v. Vincent, Justice Stevens propounded a
particularly robust version of this deference. 85 He suggested that “[b]ecause
every university’s resources are limited, an educational institution must
routinely make decisions concerning the use of the time and space that is
available.” 86 For instance, it could chose to prioritize “a program that
illuminates the genius of Walt Disney” over “an amateur performance of
Hamlet.” 87 Similarly, the university could “regard some subjects as more
relevant to its educational mission than others.” 88 But for Justice Stevens,
deference was nevertheless limited. The university could not “allow its
agreement or disagreement with the viewpoint of a particular speaker to
determine whether access to a forum will be granted.” 89 Thus, while the
university could “prefer[] some subjects over others,” it could not exclude
competing perspectives: “Quite obviously, however, the University could not
allow a group of Republicans or Presbyterians to meet while denying Democrats
or Mormons the same privilege.” 90 Under Justice Steven’s standard, in other
words, a university would be given great deference in content-based judgments,
but would face aggressive scrutiny for viewpoint-based judgments. 91
84. Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 140 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich., 474 U.S. at 225–
26).
85. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277–80 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 278.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 280.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 281.
91. In a small number of additional cases, the Supreme Court has considered professors’
individual rights that have abutted against institutional rights. In those cases, the Court has tended
to side with the institution. In Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S.
271 (1984), the Supreme Court upheld the exclusive bargaining provisions of the State of
Minnesota against the claim that exclusive bargaining violated the right of faculty members to
participate in faculty governance. Minn. St. Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 273
(1984). The Court emphasized that these sessions were “occasions for public employers, acting
solely as instrumentalities of the State, to receive policy advice from their professional employees”
and that there was “no constitutional right to force the government to listen to their views.” Id. at
282–83. However, the implications of this case are limited by the fact that it involved faculty
members claiming the right to have their views heard by the administration, rather than a situation
where faculty members were reprimanded, criticized, or in any way penalized for their speech. The
Court properly concluded that accepting the right to participate in governance “would work a
revolution in existing government practices.” Id. at 284. Moreover, the decision’s pro-union
sentiment runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions, such as Janus v. AFSCME,
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), which more highly prioritize individual speech and association rights. Even

Fall 2021]

In the Name of Diversity

529

Despite decades of ambiguous and inconsistent precedent, the Supreme Court
has never squarely resolved the central question of whose rights prevail in a
contest between institutional and individual speech rights. But it is clear from
the Court’s precedent that whatever degree of control an academic institution
has over content, it cannot impose an ideological test on its employees or require
viewpoint conformity.
B. The Pickering Test
The Supreme Court’s precedent concerning public employees, including
teachers and professors, is similarly inconclusive with respect to the clash
between institutional and individual liberty in the academic context.
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court considered whether a
school board could properly terminate a teacher who had written an opinion
editorial in the local newspaper that was highly critical of a tax increase that the
school board had proposed. 92 The Supreme Court quoted its academic freedom
decisions in Keyishian and Shelton and emphasized that the premise “that
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public
interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they
work . . . has been unequivocally rejected.” 93 The Supreme Court recognized
that allowing public school teachers to speak out is in the public interest because
these individuals are often “the members of a community most likely to have
informed and definite opinions” about significant matters of public concern
involving the operation of schools. 94 However, the Court also recognized that a
public employee is in a different position than a member of the general public.
Accordingly, the Court laid out a balancing test “between the interests of the
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer.” 95 Under Pickering there is a strong “public
interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance,” 96
but this interest must be balanced against the employer’s right to prevent speech
that would “impede[] the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the
classroom” or “interfere[] with the regular operation of the schools generally.” 97
Unfortunately, the Pickering case did little to flesh out that balancing test,
leaving it nearly impossible for lower courts to apply it with any consistency. 98
more importantly, there is no indication that the school board would have been entitled to exclude
certain perspectives based on either content or viewpoint.
92. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564–65 (1968).
93. Id. at 568.
94. Id. at 572.
95. Id at 568.
96. Id. at 573.
97. Id. at 572–73.
98. See Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a
First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 118–20 (2006) (“Pickering guaranteed a
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The Court’s subsequent decisions have only furthered the uncertainty. On the
one hand, the Supreme Court made clear that the protections of Pickering apply
to even untenured professors. 99 The Court also found that a “public employee
who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread
his views before the public” is nevertheless protected. 100
On the other hand, the Supreme Court put several additional roadblocks in the
way of a professor seeking to raise a First Amendment claim. In Connick v.
Myers, the Supreme Court emphasized that an employee is only protected when
speaking about “matters of public concern.” 101 The Court has also broadened
what may be considered in termination decisions to include “whether the
statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a
detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty
and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker’s
duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.” 102
The Supreme Court further made it procedurally more difficult for public
employees to prevail in Pickering-style cases. In Mt. Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle, a non-tenured teacher leaked an internal
memorandum concerning a new dress code to a radio station and was fired. 103
The teacher had also engaged in other unrelated improper conduct, such as
making an obscene gesture at two girls. 104 The Supreme Court found that a
public employee first bears a burden to show that constitutionally protected
speech was a “substantial factor” in the school’s conduct, and then the burden
shifts to the school board to show that it would have reached the same decision
steady flow of doctrinal disputes for decades to come.”); Jessica Reed, Note, From Pickering to
Ceballos: The Demise of the Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 95, 98
(2007) (“[T]he Court’s ruling created a compartmentalization that not only leaves public employees
vulnerable to retaliation for exposing governmental misconduct or inefficiencies, but also neglects
the public’s interest in hearing such speech.”); Molly K. Smith, Note, Compelled Investigatory and
Testimonial Speech: An Overdue Clarification of the Public Employee Speech Doctrine that
Rehabilitates “All of the Values at Stake,” 101 KY. L.J. 403, 408 (2013) (“As the public employee
speech doctrine evolved, certain drawbacks of the case-by-case approach of Connick-Pickering
became apparent.”).
99. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597–98 (1972). Circuit courts have also applied
Pickering to job applicants. See Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 866 n.12 (9th Cir. 2015)
(compiling cases).
100. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979).
101. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). This facet of the Pickering-Conning test
has been aptly criticized as a “Crank Protection Plan” because under it, “an employee who mouths
off about matters in which he has no credibility is granted more of a hearing in the public square
than an employee who actually knows what she is talking about.” Michael Bérubé, Talking out of
School: Academic Freedom and Extramural Speech, MLA: PROF. (Winter 2019), https://profess
ion.mla.org/talking-out-of-school-academic-freedom-and-extramural-speech/. This critique is
particularly appropriate in light of Garcetti. See discussion infra Section D.
102. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–73).
103. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977).
104. Id. at 281–82.
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in the absence of protected conduct. 105 This standard has made it extremely
difficult for teachers or professors to prevail in disputes with their institutions,
since the school is simply required to point to non-protected reasons for its
conduct. In Waters v. Churchill, the Supreme Court held that an employer is
merely required to “make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely
to be disruptive before it may be punished” rather than showing that the speech
in question was in fact disruptive. 106 These decisions made it substantially more
difficult for a public employee to prevail in First Amendment claims against his
employer.
C. Protection of Faculty Speech under Pickering
Under the Pickering standard, lower courts have been all over the map when
professorial speech rights have been raised. The decisions largely break down
into three categories: classroom speech, academic research, and extramural
speech. Each will briefly be considered.
1. Classroom Speech
One of the more prominent First Amendment issues to arise in the university
setting involves professorial speech in the classroom itself. Courts have
typically been highly solicitous of the institution’s right to establish its own
curriculum and pedagogy. For instance, the Third Circuit has held that “a public
university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will
be taught in the classroom,” and that the university is free to “make contentbased decisions when shaping its curriculum.” 107
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit has declared that “the argument that
teachers have no First Amendment rights when teaching, or that the government
can censor teacher speech without restriction, is totally unpersuasive.” 108 To the
contrary, the court emphasized that “[b]ecause the essence of a teacher’s role is
to prepare students for their place in society as responsible citizens, classroom
instruction will often fall within the Supreme Court’s broad conception of
‘public concern.’” 109 The Sixth Circuit has been particularly protective of the
individual rights of professors in connection to classroom speech and related
105. Id. at 287.
106. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994).
107. Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491–92 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Bradley v.
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176–77 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Although a teacher’s out-ofclass conduct, including her advocacy of particular teaching methods, is protected . . . her in-class
conduct is not.”).
108. Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2001).
109. Id. at 679; see also Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 816–17 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Stated
more broadly, there is a public interest concern involved in the issue of the extent of a professor’s
independence and unfettered freedom to speak in an academic setting.”); Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1055 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a professor’s classroom discussion
about the uses of hemp was protected speech).
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activity. For instance, it held that a professor has “the right to review each of
his students’ work and to communicate, according to his own professional
judgment, academic evaluations and traditional letter grades,” and accordingly,
a university could not order a professor to change a grade to prevent the
professor from communicating his personal evaluation to the student (although
the university could change the grade itself). 110 In contrast, several other circuits
have rejected very similar claims regarding grading decisions. 111
Other circuits have a mixed legacy with respect to their handling of classroom
speech cases. The Second Circuit has “held that school administrators may limit
the content of school-sponsored speech so long as the limitations are ‘reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’” 112 On the other hand, the Second
Circuit also rejected the notion that a university could “retaliate[] against [a
professor] based upon the content of his classroom discourse,” declaring that
such an action would be “as a matter of law, objectively unreasonable.” 113
By and large, however, faculty members tend to lose their suits against
universities with great frequency. 114 These numbers are in some ways inflated
in favor of universities by the existence of frivolous complaints and the tendency
of schools to only contest cases they have predetermined are winnable. 115
Nevertheless, classroom speech appears to be an area where courts are
particularly prone to defer to academic institutions and their ability to regulate
the content of what is actually being taught to students. On the other hand, when
an administration takes action based on “the content of . . . classroom
discourse,” 116 and particularly the viewpoint of that discourse, Courts have been
willing to second guess academic actions.

110. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 829 (6th Cir. 1989).
111. See Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 79 (3d Cir. 2001); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252,
257 (7th Cir. 1992). Scholarship has been split on whether grading decisions are protected speech.
See Jennifer L.M. Jacobs, Note, Grade “A” Certified: The First Amendment Significance of
Grading by Public University Professors, 87 MINN. L. REV. 813, 814 (2003) (arguing that grading
is the university’s speech rather than the professor’s speech). But see Kevin A. Rosenfield, Note,
Brown v. Armenti and the First Amendment Protection of Teachers and Professors in Grading
Their Students, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (2003) (arguing that grading may be protected by
the First Amendment if pedagogically based).
112. Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 934–35 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Silano v. Sag
Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722 (2d Cir. 1994)).
113. Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 598 (2d Cir. 1990).
114. Michael H. LeRoy, How Courts View Academic Freedom, 42 J. COLL. & U.L. 1, 27
(2016).
115. Id. at 40.
116. Dube, 900 F.2d at 598.
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2. Academic Research
Just as with cases concerning classroom speech, decisions regarding academic
research generally come out in favor of the university. 117 However, almost none
of the cases have involved faculty being discriminated against for engaging in
research that an administration disagrees with or dislikes. Instead, these cases
often involve professors being denied certain perquisites or job opportunities
such as the ability to apply for certain grants, 118 access to laboratory space, 119
travel to countries designated as terrorist states to conduct research, 120 or the
ability to be on a particular research grant project. 121 Other cases involve clear
misconduct not related to First Amendment activities. 122
The most prominent campus speech case involving academic research is
Urofsky v. Gilmore. 123 In that case, the en banc Fourth Circuit rejected the
argument that a Virginia law restricting state employees (including professors)
from accessing sexually explicit material with state-owned computers violated
the First Amendment. 124 The reasoning of Urofsky is disturbing because the
Fourth Circuit essentially rejected any special First Amendment protection for
professors, concluding that “[t]he Supreme Court, to the extent it has
constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized
only an institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs.” 125 Even
worse, the Fourth Circuit effectively rejected the claim “that professors possess
a First Amendment right of academic freedom to determine for themselves the
117. Lawrence White, Fifty Years of Academic Freedom Jurisprudence, 36 J. COLL. & U.L.
791, 832 (2010).
118. See, e.g., Martinez v. Univ. of P.R., Civil No. 06-1713 (JAF), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92925, at *3, 11 (D.P.R. Dec. 22, 2006) (emphasizing that the university had taken action based on
“the mere idea or proposal to write a book, and not to any actual, created speech”).
119. See, e.g., Naftchi v. N.Y. Univ., 14 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481–82, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
120. See, e.g., Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1207 (S.D.
Fla. 2007) (“The Act does not prohibit scholarship about the designated countries, or discussion (in
or outside of the classroom) about those countries, their governments, policies, etc. Nor does it
prohibit students, faculty members, or researchers from traveling to the countries, or punish them
in any way for engaging in such travel. The Act simply establishes that Florida, as a state, will not
pay for these excursions.”).
121. See, e.g., Radolf v. Univ. of Conn., 364 F. Supp. 2d 204, 215 (D. Conn. 2005) (“It is
important at the outset to emphasize precisely what Dr. Radolf claims was a violation of his First
Amendment right to academic freedom. He does not assert that Defendants prevented him from
teaching or performing research on any subject matter. Nor does he claim in Count 2 that
Defendants retaliated against him for engaging in protected First Amendment activities, by, for
example, denying him the opportunity to participate in a grant available to others because of his
speech on matters of public concern.”).
122. See, e.g., San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1135 n.14 (3d Cir. 1992) (“He was
not dismissed, nor does he allege that he was dismissed, for any reason relating to anything that
could be considered a free expression issue.”).
123. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
124. Id. at 404.
125. Id. at 412.
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content of their courses and scholarship.” 126 This decision has properly been
described as the “nadir” of court protection for individual academic freedom. 127
But for purposes of this article, it is significant that Urofsky is not an example of
discrimination based on the content of academic research. Instead, Urofsky
concerned the ability of a professor to carry out his research using state funded
resources. Thus, Urofsky cannot be read as supportive of the ability of an
academic institution to penalize a professor for the subject matter of his
academic research. Urofsky also seems to have been tacitly overturned, or at the
very least seriously undermined. 128
One other case comes a bit closer to suggesting that a university can take
action based on the content of academic research, but still does not involve any
kind of viewpoint-based discrimination. A professor at the University of Illinois
was denied tenure and terminated purportedly because “his area of research
overlapped that of an already tenured professor.” 129 The Seventh Circuit
It emphasized that
rejected this argument as “patently frivolous.” 130
“[a]cademic freedom does not empower a professor to dictate to the University
what research will be done using the school’s facilities or how many faculty
positions will be devoted to a particular area.” 131 The Court’s curt dismissal of
this claim is likely attributable to the fact that the claim was raised for the first
time on appeal, and it also does not appear that there was any evidence of
discrimination based on viewpoint. 132
On the other hand, faculty freedom to engage in research has been upheld in
two cases involving an attempt to subpoena research, rather than disputes within
the academy. 133 Although these cases are not directly on point, they indicate the
significance of the relationship between academic research and a professor’s
ability to access academic freedom. The Seventh Circuit recognized that such
subpoenas would be “capable of chilling the exercise of academic freedom”
126. Id. at 414.
127. White, supra note 117, at 832–33. Urofsky has been the subject of a particularly robust
critique over the years. See e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom in Scholarship
and in Court, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 5, 2001) (“Because the [en banc Urofsky] court relied
in no small part on a scholarly article by me to support its conclusion, I feel a duty to express my
professional view that the opinion is profoundly wrong as a matter of law, and threatens the freedom
of higher education.”); Michael D. Hancock, Note, Why Urofsky v. Gilmore Still Fails to Satisfy,
RICHMOND
J.L.
&
TECH.
(Winter
1999–2000),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/joltarchive/v6i3/note2.html; Steven G. Olswang, The Demise of Academic Freedom: Urofsky v.
Gilmore, 22nd Annual Law & Higher Education Conference, STETSON U. COLL. L., (Feb. 18–20,
2001),
https://www.stetson.edu/law/conferences/highered/archive/2001/The_Demise_of_
Academic_Freedom.doc.
128. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
129. McElearney v. Univ. of Ill., 612 F.2d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 1979).
130. Id. at 288.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1265–66 (7th Cir. 1982); Cusumano v.
Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 710 (1st Cir. 1998); see also White, supra note 117, at 831–32.
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because the danger of research being inappropriately expropriated and
scrutinized would “tend to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities
at once so fragile and so indispensable for fruitful academic labor.” 134 These
cases therefore set an important baseline for the importance of academic
freedom in research endeavors. Academic speech must be protected because
otherwise scholars will be inhibited in their willingness to pursue knowledge
that is innovative, cutting-edge, or controversial.
In the absence of cases directly on point, it is difficult to say what courts will
do if faced with an example of a professor who is being excluded or rewarded
for the viewpoint expressed in her research. Scholarship on this point, however,
tends to favor robust protection for academic research, even when the author
may be supportive of greater restrictions on classroom speech. 135 There is
something uniquely personal about academic research, which suggests that
university efforts to trample on this kind of academic freedom should be met
with especially rigorous scrutiny.
3. Extramural Speech
Extramural speech is a broad category of speech that can encompass anything
a professor says and does outside of teaching and research. Extramural speech
is generally recognized as one of the key aspects of religious freedom, even
though it may be “the most mysterious and the most elusive of the three.” 136
Scholars debate whether extramural speech is in fact academic speech at all. 137
This debate is largely theoretical in nature, however, since in practice extramural
speech is the most fully and consistently protected kind of professorial speech.
For instance, an Eastern Michigan University professor was allowed to
challenge his suspension for racially tinged tweets critical of the university’s

134. Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1276 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
262 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
135. See, e.g., Yudof, supra note 69, at 842 (“First, there must be unbridled freedom to do
research, while the constraints in the classroom are more severe. Research outside of the classroom
may be thought to be more analogous to the speaker in the park than to the hired speaker in the post
office or university building.”).
136. Bérubé, supra note 101. Michael Bérubé intriguingly analogized extramural speech to
the “Holy Spirit of the Christian Trinity.” Id.
137. Matthew W. Finkin and Robert C. Post have called extramural speech “[t]he most
theoretically problematic aspect of academic freedom” since it does not concern the development
of specialized academic knowledge. MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON
GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 127 (2009). See also infra note 335 for
further discussion of Finkin and Post. Professor Keith E. Whittington has recently written a
thoughtful account of extramural speech and how its protection serves as a “prophylactic rule” that
protects efforts to disseminate knowledge outside of the scholarly community. Keith E.
Whittington, Academic Freedom and the Scope of Protections for Extramural Speech, ACADEME
(Winter
2019),
https://www.aaup.org/article/academic-freedom-and-scope-protectionsextramural-speech#.YDLEMjKSlyy. Whittington’s highly persuasive account shows why the
protection of extramural speech is vital to both free speech and academic freedom.
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response to an incident of racially motivated graffiti on the university campus. 138
The court first concluded that the professor spoke as a private citizen because
“[u]sing a public forum to comment on the University’s response to recent racial
incidents would not appear to be within a history professor’s official duties.” 139
Significantly, the court rejected the university’s claim that the speech in question
would cause disharmony between the professor, his colleagues, and the
students. 140 The court emphasized that “[i]n the academic setting ‘dissent is
expected’ and, accordingly, so is at least some disharmony.” 141
Similarly, the Second Circuit found that a university erred when it penalized
a professor for his controversial racial views that were expressed solely outside
of the classroom. 142 The university created alternative class sections for all
students that felt offended by the professor’s views and threatened to take further
disciplinary action against the professor. 143 Both the Southern District of New
York and the Second Circuit critiqued the administration for not taking further
action to prevent disruption of the professor’s class. 144 The District Court noted
that the university’s claim “that exposure in the campus environment to [the]
Professor[’s] views might somehow have caused some students harm . . . could
have constitutionally been accorded no weight” because a university “may not
hinder the exercise of first amendment rights simply because it feels that
exposure to a given group’s ideas may be somehow harmful to certain
students.” 145
In summary, looking at the vast run of professorial speech cases in the lower
courts, courts tend to be highly deferential to academic institutions. But there is
a consistent thread that when professors are punished because of disagreement
based on the viewpoint of the speech, courts are much more likely to intervene
and to scrutinize university action closely and carefully. Courts are also much
more likely to scrutinize university action when it concerns speech that is
removed from the classroom and involves the professor’s own personal thoughts
on topics of public concern.
138. Initially, the plaintiff filed with his union and an arbiter reversed the suspension.
However, the court in this case ruled on a motion to dismiss based on a claim of qualified immunity
and said that the university may prevail on summary judgment after more discovery. Final
judgment was never issued and the case was dismissed at the request of the parties after the first
motion. Higbee v. E. Mich. Univ., 399 F. Supp. 3d 694, 697, 700 (E.D. Mich. 2019), case
dismissed, No. 19-1751, 2019 WL 5079254 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 2019).
139. Id. at 702.
140. Id. at 703–04.
141. Id. at 704 (quoting Smith v. Coll. of the Mainland, 63 F. Supp. 3d 712, 718–19 (S.D. Tex.
2014)).
142. Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85, 89–90 (2d Cir. 1992).
143. Id. at 87–88.
144. Id. at 90.
145. Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Gay All. of Students v. Matthews, 544 F.2d 162, 166 (4th Cir.
1976).
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D. Garcetti
Pickering and its progeny left public employee speech rights in a somewhat
precarious position. But, as previously discussed, professors could still prevail
under Pickering, especially when viewpoint discrimination was involved or
when the restrictions concerned extramural speech. However, the Supreme
Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos put continued protection for
professorial speech rights in great jeopardy. 146
In Garcetti, a district attorney wrote a memo criticizing his office’s handling
of a case and urging its dismissal. 147 The defense called the attorney and testified
regarding his concerns. 148 His employer then retaliated against him. 149 The
Ninth Circuit had found that the attorney’s speech was protected under the
Pickering test. 150 The Supreme Court reversed. 151 In doing so, the Supreme
Court imposed two significant limitations on Pickering’s employee speech
protections. The first is that an employer is entitled to take action against speech
that merely “has some potential to affect the entity’s operations.” 152 The second,
even more dramatic change, was that “when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.” 153 Restrictions on such speech
“does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen.” 154 Instead, it “reflects the exercise of employer control over what the
employer itself has commissioned or created.” 155
The potential implications for academic freedom are enormous. Much of what
a professor does, such as teaching, writing, publishing, and presenting at
symposia, could be described as “pursuant to their official duties.” 156 If
Garcetti’s logic were strictly applied to professors, then it could eviscerate any
protection they had at all. Justice Souter, in his pointed dissent, noted that
teachers “necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties’” and,
therefore, the majority opinion could have grave consequences for the protection
of academic freedom. 157 In response, the majority opinion recognized that
“[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
Id. at 414.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 415.
Id. at 415–16.
Id. at 417.
Id. at 418.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 421.
Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech
jurisprudence.” 158 But rather than resolve the issue, the Court punted, declaring
that it “need not . . . decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply
in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching.” 159
Scholars have largely shared Justice Souter’s concern, arguing that professors
are employed to engage in a career of open inquiry and that this vocation makes
Garcetti inapplicable to them. 160 On the other hand, some scholars have
defended Garcetti, arguing that Garcetti properly protects the right of academic
institutions to weigh the quality and relevance of academic speech. 161

158. Id. at 425.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., Joseph J. Martins, Tipping the Pickering Balance: A Proposal for Heightened
First Amendment Protection for the Teaching and Scholarship of Public University Professors, 25
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 657–58 (2016); Hilary Habib, Note, Academic Freedom and the
First Amendment in the Garcetti Era, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 509, 536–37 (2013); David Fox,
Comment, Turning Up the Heat on Science: A New Threat to Academic Freedom, 43 U. TOL. L.
REV. 173, 193–94 (2011); Erica Goldberg & Kelly Sarabyn, Measuring a “Degree of Deference”:
Institutional Academic Freedom in a Post-Grutter World, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 217, 250–52
(2011); Lauren K. Ross, Pursuing Academic Freedom After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 91 TEX. L. REV.
1253, 1278–79 (2013) (“My proposed academic freedom exception to Garcetti would go beyond
simply protecting professors when they talk in a classroom or publish research and would ensure
that they are protected when they further the academic function of the university. This exception
should include protecting professors’ speech when they talk about the university’s curriculum;
when they challenge hiring decisions based on professional standards, that speech should be
protected as well.”); Oren R. Griffin, Academic Freedom and Professorial Speech in the PostGarcetti World, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (2013); Matthew Reid Krell, The Ivory Tower
Under Siege: A Constitutional Basis for Academic Freedom, 21 GEO. MASON U. CIV.RTS. L.J. 259,
266–68 (2011).
161. Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 656–57 (2012) (arguing that Garcetti should apply to universities in
full because academic institutions should be able to make content and quality-based distinctions)
(“The point, again, is that the academic environment is one in which assessments of quality are
vitally important. There may be no such thing as a false idea, as far as the First Amendment is
concerned, but in reality, there is such a thing as a bad article or a soporific lecture, and schools
cannot function if they are denied the ability to make that judgment. The math teacher who decides
to lecture on political science instead may be discussing matters of public concern in a
nondisruptive manner, but he is doing his job badly.”); Nancy J. Whitmore, First Amendment
Showdown: Intellectual Diversity Mandates and the Academic Marketplace, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y
321, 338 (2008) (“The academic marketplace functions neither as an economic marketplace driven
by laws of supply and demand nor as a wide-open, uninhibited marketplace where multitudes of
differing ideas can clash. At its core, it is a closed community of scholars and administrators
committed to expression that advances knowledge. Knowledge, in this community, is largely based
on the collective judgment of those scholars and administrators [ ] whose work conforms to the
standards set and accepted by the academic marketplace.”); Paul Forster, Teaching in a Democracy:
Why the Garcetti Rule Should Apply to Teaching in Public Schools, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 687, 696–97
(2011).
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E. The Circuit Split over Garcetti
Courts following Garcetti have been largely split as to whether Garcetti
applies in the academic setting.
1. Courts Applying Garcetti
The Seventh Circuit has applied Garcetti and, in Renken v. Gregory, ruled that
a professor who criticized how his university administered grant funds was not
protected because he had been a grant recipient as part of his “teaching and
service responsibilities.” 162 Similarly, in an earlier case, the Seventh Circuit
held that an elementary school teacher could be fired for telling students about
how she had honked her car in solidarity with protests against the Iraq war. 163
The court emphasized that a teacher is hired for her speech and that “[e]xpression
is a teacher’s stock in trade, the commodity she sells to her employer in exchange
for a salary.” 164 Accordingly, this was “an easier case for the employer than
Garcetti.” 165 However, the court appeared to reserve the question of “[h]ow
much room is left for constitutional protection of scholarly viewpoints in postsecondary education.” 166 But post-Renken in the states within the Seventh
Circuit, a professor’s in-class speech would likely be entitled to no First
Amendment protection at all, and most other forms of academically related
speech would be on extremely thin ice.
Other than the Seventh Circuit, most of the other courts embracing Garcetti
have done so rather tepidly and tentatively, or without any analysis at all. 167 In
a non-precedential decision, the Fifth Circuit applied Garcetti to the speech of a
professor who was seeking a prestigious professorship and a deanship. 168 The
162. Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769, 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2008).
163. Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2007).
164. Id. at 479.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 480.
167. Some courts have applied Garcetti without discussing the Supreme Court’s qualifying
language. For instance, the Second Circuit applied Garcetti to a school teacher’s speech expressing
concern that the school district had not disciplined a student because the speech concerned his duty
“to maintain classroom discipline, which is an indispensable prerequisite to effective teaching and
classroom learning.” Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 2010). Judge Calabresi
dissented and critiqued the court’s expansive interpretation of Garcetti, but also did not discuss the
language in Garcetti concerning academic freedom. See id. at 205–09. Perhaps that is because this
case arose in the secondary education context rather than higher education. See also Fernandez v.
Sch. Bd., 898 F.3d 1324, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1345 (2019). Scholars
have critiqued courts for failing to discuss this tension between Garcetti and the First Amendment
rights of professors and have raised concerns that these decisions “could effectively extinguish
constitutionally based faculty academic freedom in the classroom.” Leonard M. Niehoff, Peculiar
Marketplace: Applying Garcetti v. Ceballos in the Public Higher Education Context, 35 J. COLL.
& U.L. 75, 96 (2008); Neal H. Hutchens, A Confused Concern of the First Amendment: The
Uncertain Status of Constitutional Protection for Individual Academic Freedom, 36 J. COLL. &
U.L. 145, 160 (2009).
168. Wetherbe v. Smith, 593 F. App’x 323, 325, 327–28 (5th Cir. 2014).
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professor was excluded from the search because he opposed the tenure system
and, accordingly, had not taken tenure himself and had spoken out against
tenure. 169 The court found that “his tenure status is a condition of employment
that is inextricably entwined with his role as an employee” and that, accordingly,
“[h]e is no more protected from adverse action for his tenure status than a
plaintiff would be for refusing to attend training or complete peer
evaluations.” 170 Because the professor’s speech had arisen in the context of the
hiring search, he “was not speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public
concern.” 171 The court then emphasized that Garcetti was the proper standard
for speech relating to a job interview because “[i]nterviews necessarily involve
discussions that touch on matters that—when addressed in the public sphere—
might count as issues of public concern,” and an employer must be free to ask
about such thing as “leadership philosophy” in order “to gauge whether the
applicant will be an effective employee.” 172 An employer must be free to
“screen applicants to ensure that they actually will perform their duties with
maximal diligence.” 173 In a footnote, however, the Fifth Circuit qualified its
opinion by noting that “[w]e need not answer today whether and to what degree
the questioning must be related to the position that the applicant is seeking.” 174
2. Courts Refusing to Apply Garcetti
In sharp contrast to the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit sharply rejected the
application of Garcetti to state-employed teachers. In Demers v. Austin, the
court considered the case of a tenured college professor who was punished for
critiquing the nature of social science research in the academy. 175 The Ninth
Circuit explained that this was “the kind of case that worried Justice Souter”
since “teaching and academic writing are at the core of the official duties of
teachers and professors.” 176 Because such speech is “‘a special concern of the
First Amendment’ . . . Garcetti would directly conflict with the important First
Amendment values previously articulated by the Supreme Court.” 177
Accordingly, the court would continue to apply the Pickering test rather than
Garcetti to “teaching and academic writing.” 178
169. Id. at 325.
170. Id. at 327.
171. Id. at 328.
172. Id. at 329.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 329 n.8.
175. Demers v. Austin, 746 F.3d 402, 406, 408 (9th Cir. 2014).
176. Id. at 411.
177. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967).
178. Id. at 412. See also Kerr v. Hurd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 843–44 (S.D. Ohio 2010)
(construing a broad academic freedom exception to Garcetti); Sheldon v. Dhillon, No. C-08-03438
RMW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110275, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2009).
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The Fourth Circuit similarly rejected the application of Garcetti. 179 It
acknowledged that “[t]here may be instances in which a public university faculty
member’s assigned duties include a specific role in declaring or administering
university policy, as opposed to scholarship or teaching.” 180 In such
circumstances, Garcetti might apply. But “[a]pplying Garcetti to the academic
work of a public university faculty member . . . could place beyond the reach of
First Amendment protection many forms of public speech or service a professor
engaged in during his employment.” 181 In other words, general First
Amendment principles would apply unless a professor’s speech was “tied to any
more specific or direct employee duty than the general concept that professors
will engage in writing, public appearances, and service within their respective
fields.” 182
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit issued a significant decision rejecting Garcetti
in the context of a professor’s in-class speech. 183 Nicholas Meriwether is a
philosophy professor at Shawnee State University. 184 Because of his deeplyheld religious beliefs he objected to a requirement that all professors refer to
students by the students’ preferred gender pronouns. 185 The university
repeatedly rejected Merriweather’s requests for various accommodations or
compromises, such as the option of complying with the policy but putting a
disclaimer in the class syllabus that he was doing so under compulsion. 186 The
university investigated and found that Merriweather’s treatment of transgender
students was discriminatory and placed a formal warning in his personnel file. 187
The Court found that Garcetti did not apply to a professor “at least when
179. See generally Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir.
2011). This decision by the Fourth Circuit is somewhat curious, given that in 2000, the en banc
Fourth Circuit essentially rejected the notion that professors have any distinct First Amendment
protections above and beyond any other public employee. See generally Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216
F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000). The court held that “[t]he Supreme Court, to the extent it has
constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized only an
institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs.” Id. at 412. It is difficult to reconcile
Urofsky and Adams in any way other than seeing Adams as a tacit rejection of the conclusion that
professors are not entitled to special First Amendment protection. See supra notes 123–127 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Urofsky.
180. Adams, 640 F.3d at 563.
181. Id. at 564.
182. Id. at 563–64.
183. The Sixth Circuit previously applied Garcetti in a high school setting and said that
Garcetti “has particular resonance in the context of public education.” On the other hand, it noted
that academic freedom “‘was conceived and implemented in the university’ out of concern for
‘teachers who are also researchers or scholars—work not generally expected of elementary and
secondary school teachers.’” Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch.
Dist., 624 F.3d 332, 342–44 (6th Cir. 2010).
184. Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 498 (6th Cir. 2021).
185. Id. at 498–99.
186. Id. at 500.
187. Id. at 501.
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engaged in core academic functions, such as teaching and scholarship.” 188 In
light of the Supreme Court’s declaration of the “essentiality of freedom in the
community of American universities,” 189 it would be “alarming” if professors
lacked free-speech protections when teaching. 190 A few additional circuits
also appear to have rejected the application of Garcetti, but without much
analysis as to why. 191
3. A Note of Concern from the Supreme Court
Recently, four members of the Supreme Court expressed their concern with
how some courts have expansively applied the Garcetti test. In Kennedy v.
Bremerton School District, a football coach had been fired for praying on the
football field before games. 192 The Ninth Circuit applied Garcetti and affirmed
the dismissal. 193 Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh all concurred
in the denial of certiorari, but voiced their concern with the Ninth Circuit
decision below. They accused the Ninth Circuit of “appear[ing] to regard
teachers and coaches as being on duty at all times from the moment they report
for work to the moment they depart, provided that they are within the eyesight
of students.” 194 But “[t]his Court certainly has never read Garcetti to go that
far.” 195 Although this case is not about Garcetti’s application to higher
education, it does suggest that the Court’s more conservative members may have
grown uncomfortable with an expansive reading of Garcetti. If so, this would
be a significant development since Justice Breyer, who dissented in Garcetti,
remains on the Court, while the original author of Garcetti, Justice Kennedy, has
retired.
4. A Brief Recap
Just as the Supreme Court has not resolved or squarely addressed the
centralized tension between individual and institutional speech rights, it has
188. Id. at 505.
189. Id. at 504 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
190. Id. at 506.
191. See McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 865 (8th Cir. 2009);
Buchanan v. Alexander, 919 F.3d 847, 853 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d
800, 810 (6th Cir. 2001)), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 432 (2019). The Second Circuit has gone in a
somewhat different direction. It has not yet resolved whether Garcetti applies to teachers or
professors, but it has “held that school administrators may limit the content of school-sponsored
speech so long as the limitations are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” LeeWalker v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 3d 484, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Panse v.
Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 934–35 (2d Cir. 2008)), aff’d, 712 F. App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2017). This
intermediate standard would allow for some limited First Amendment protection of academic
speech but would largely defer to the institution.
192. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 635 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 636.
194. Id. at 636.
195. Id.
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similarly not addressed the lingering division over the application of Garcetti.
In some circuits, a professor has little to no protection, while in other circuits,
the Pickering test applies with some force. In either event, courts are prone to
defer to academic institutions in their academic judgments and evaluations. But
that deference may be more limited when dealing with extramural speech or
when viewpoint discrimination can be detected. With this legal background
established, it is time to take a close look at mandatory diversity statements and
consider how changes to the nature of higher education could or should alter the
legal landscape.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIVERSITY STATEMENT
Requiring faculty applicants to complete a diversity statement is a recent trend
in higher education that has been employed most aggressively by the UC system.
But UC is far from the only university to encourage or require faculty members
or applicants to write about diversity issues. 196 For instance, at Virginia Tech, a
professor is encouraged to reference “active involvement in diversity and
inclusion” as part of her personal statement, and also to include a “list of
activities that promote or contribute to inclusive teaching, research, outreach,
and service.” 197 In 2017, the Oregon Association of Scholars estimated that
twenty major universities or university systems in the U.S. made use of
mandatory diversity statements. 198 This number has likely grown since then.
This article, nevertheless, focuses on the UC system because it has been on the
forefront of the growth of the diversity statement, and holds itself out as a model
for others to emulate. 199 It is likely that whatever trends have developed in the
UC system will sooner or later spread elsewhere, especially if UC does not face
significant legal or political pushback. 200

196. See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 650–51.
197. Office of the Exec. Vice President and Provost, Virginia Tech Guidelines for Promotion
and Tenure Dossiers for 2021–22, VA. TECH (May 13, 2021), https://faculty.vt.edu/content/
faculty_vt_edu/en/promotion-tenure/_jcr_content/content/vtcontainer_76178668/vtcontainercontent/vtmultitab_copy/vt-items_4/download/file.res/Professors%20of%20Practice%20
Dossier%20Guidelines%202020-2021.pdf.
198. The Imposition of Diversity Statements on Faculty Hiring and Promotion at Oregon
Universities, OR. ASS’N OF SCHOLARS 4 (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.oregonscholars.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/DiversityStatements_Rev16Mar17.pdf.
199. The UC system describes its policy as “a national model for universities to recognize and
credit contributions to equal opportunity and diversity when evaluating faculty achievement for
appointment, advancement, and promotion.” Letter from Aimée Dorr, Provost and Exec. Vice
President Acad. Affs. to Chancellors, UC OFF. OF THE PROVOST & EXEC. VICE PRESIDENT FOR
ACAD. AFFS. (June 29, 2015), https://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-programs/_files/apm/
apm-210-1-d-issuance/apm-210-1-d-issuance-ltr.pdf.
200. BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE FALL OF THE FACULTY 113 (2011) (noting that universities
are prone to copy diversity programs and policies set by peer institutions).
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Consideration of a “contribution[ ] to diversity” at UC began very modestly
and rather unobjectionably. 201 In 2005, the Academic Personnel Manual (APM)
was revised to include several references to contributions to diversity in the
Appointment and Promotion section. The stated goal of these changes was to
ensure that “[t]eaching, research, professional and public service contributions
that promote diversity and equal opportunity are to be encouraged and given
recognition in the evaluation of the candidate’s qualifications.” 202 Already at
that time, there were some signs of concern that previewed the subsequent role
these statements would come to play. For instance, the policy suggested that
credit should be given for “research in a scholar’s area of expertise that
highlights inequalities,” which suggests that certain kinds of research would be
viewed more favorably than others in the hiring process. 203
Nevertheless, the policy as written is mostly innocuous. Professors who
engage in activities such as mentoring underprivileged students may expend
significant energy that is not reflected in traditional scholarly output. It is
difficult to see anything wrong or sinister with taking these kinds of
contributions to the university community into account. In 2015 204, the policy
was expanded modestly to emphasize that contributions to diversity “should be
evaluated and credited in the same way as other faculty achievements,” but the
role that contributions to diversity plays remained largely unchanged. 205 The
APM is a document that emerges only through extensive university-wide
discussion, which includes faculty senate deliberations. 206 It is, therefore, the
document that best captures what policies maintain a robust consensus among
all the UC schools, and what is absent from the APM is, therefore, especially
striking.
The systemwide consensus, as recently as 2015, rested on two foundational
pillars:
201. Academic Personnel Manual, Appointment and Promotion (APM-210), UC 4 (Feb. 1,
1994), https://web.archive.org/web/20140809092341/http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnelprograms/_files/apm/apm-210.pdf.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See Academic Personnel Policy Issuance (APM-210-1-d), UC SANTA BARBARA 4 (July
1, 2015), https://ap.ucsb.edu/news.and.announcements/memos/?7.1.2015.Revised.APM.210.1.d;.
Review.and.Appraisal.Committees.
205. Academic Personnel Manual, Appointment and Promotion (APM-210), UC 4 (Feb. 1,
1994), https://web.archive.org/web/20140809092341/http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnelprograms/_files/apm/apm-210.pdf.
This relatively modest change engendered extensive
disagreements among the various faculty committees that considered changes, which underscores
that this topic remains controversial among faculty members. See Letter from Aimée Dorr, supra
note 199; Office of the President, Chronology of the Consultation Process for APM-210-1-d
Effective July 1, 2015, UC (June 29, 2015), https://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnelprograms/_files/apm/apm-210-1-d-issuance/apm-210-1-d-iss-ltr-appdx.pdf.
206. Office of Acad. Pers., Academic Personnel Manual (APM) Policy Development Process
Guide, UC 1–3, https://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-programs/_files/policy-developmentprocess/policy-development-process-guide.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
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[F]irst, that faculty efforts in promoting equal opportunity and
diversity should be evaluated and credited on the same basis as other
contributions, but should not be understood as constituting a “fourth
leg” of evaluation, along with research and creative activity, teaching,
and service; and second, that these contributions should not receive
more credit than other contributions simply on the basis of their
subject matter. 207
Consideration of a contribution to diversity is not intended to give a leg up
“simply on the basis of their subject matter.” 208 There is no mandate that every
applicant fill out a separate diversity statement and no suggestion that a
candidate without contributions to diversity should be rejected out of hand.
Instead, as originally envisioned and currently enshrined in a system-wide
policy, contributions to diversity were intended to be seen as a plus-factor and
not a separate and discreet hiring requirement.
Almost immediately various campuses of the UC system began to interpret
this policy in dramatically different ways. Over the past few years, almost all of
the UC schools have adopted a requirement that all faculty applicants file a
separate standalone diversity statement. 209 UC Santa Barbara had long been a
holdout against the trend towards requiring these separate statements, 210 but
207. Letter from Mary Gilly, Chair of the Assembly of the Acad. Senate, UC, to Susan Carlson,
Vice Provost for Acad. Pers. and Programs, in Chronology of the Consultation Process for APM210-1-d.
208. Id.
209. There is some uncertainty as to what exactly the policy is at UC Berkeley at the moment.
Berkeley’s Senate Search Guide at one point stated that “[a]ll applications require a Curriculum
Vitae and a statement on diversity, equity, and inclusion.” This was pointed out to UC Berkeley
administrators in January 2020. Conversation with Dan Mogulof, Assistant Vice Chancellor for
Exec. Commc’ns, U.C. (Jan. 29, 2020) (on file with author). Thereafter, the language was updated
to read: “The default assumption in AP Recruit (with standard auto-populated language) is to
require a statement on diversity, equity, inclusion, and belonging (DEIB) as part of the initial
application. Given the requirement to assess DEIB as part of the evaluation process, the majority
of committees choose to ask for such a statement up front.” However, a department could also
choose to ask for the statement from a more limited portion of the applicant pool (e.g., candidates
under serious consideration). Office for Faculty Equity and Welfare, Senate Search Guide, UC
BERKELEY, https://ofew.berkeley.edu/senate-search-guide (last visited Mar. 10, 2021). So,
diversity statements are technically not required at UC Berkeley but are expected unless a search
committee affirmatively decides not to require them.
210. As recently as September 2020, the UC Santa Barbara “Red Binder” stated that “[t]here
is no presumption that all faculty will engage with this opportunity, nor are diversity statements
required . . . . As with the teaching self-assessment, the diversity statement is an opportunity to
provide context and evidence of impact or effectiveness towards a fuller understanding of those
contributions.” Red Binder § I-75: Appointment and Advancement, UC SANTA BARBARA 11 (Sept.
2020),
https://ap.ucsb.edu/policies.and.procedures/red.binder/sections/%5B1_75%5D%20Appointment
%20and%20Advancement.pdf. The UC Santa Barbara Committee on Academic Personnel has also
declared that it “is opposed to requiring statements for merit cases.” Comm. on Acad. Pers.,
Videoconference Minutes, UC ACAD. SENATE 3 (May 8, 2019), https://senate.
universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/committees/ucap/ucap-5-8-2019-minutes.pdf.
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appears to have finally relented. 211 Similarly, some schools, such as UCLA,
have already begun mandating consideration of contributions to diversity in
tenure and advancement decisions. 212
In the past few years, there has been a push by system-wide diversity officers
to force all campuses in the UC system to more aggressively adopt these
diversity statements. In November 2018, the UC Systemwide Equal
Opportunity/Affirmative Action Administrators Group developed a statement
jointly with the statewide faculty Senate Committee on Affirmative Action,
Diversity and Equity (UCAADE) entitled “Recommendations for The Use of
Contributions to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Statements for
Academic Positions at the University of California.” 213 This document was
approved by the Academic Council on January 23, 2019. 214 It made a series of
six recommendations:
Require all faculty applicants at the University of California to submit
a DEI statement.
Provide guidance to potential candidates on how to prepare DEI
statements.
Create an assessment rubric, in consultation with the Equity Advisor
or equivalent, to evaluate the candidate’s ability.
Further assess candidates’ readiness to advance diversity, equity, and
inclusions during the campus visit.
Ensure department-level accountability.
Each campus should develop guidelines to implement the use of DEI
statements in a consistent manner to align expectations regarding
assessment of diversity contributions from time of hiring through
academic reviews for merit and promotion. 215
There are a couple of elements in these recommendations that are noteworthy
and troubling. With regard to the development of an assessment rubric,
candidates would be required to “[a]rticulate awareness and understanding of
211. See Diversity Statement Guidelines, UC SANTA BARBARA, THE GEVIRTZ SCHOOL,
https://education.ucsb.edu/diversity-statement-guidelines (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (“A Diversity
Statement is required as one component of a complete application, and will be reviewed by the
search committee along with your other materials.”).
212. Memorandum from Scott L. Waugh, Exec. Vice Chancellor & Provost, to Deans, the
University Librarian, Department Chairs, and Equity Advisors, UCLA (May 24, 2018),
https://equity.ucla.edu/news-and-events/new-edi-statement-requirement-for-regular-rank-facultysearches/. However, based on a private conversation with a faculty member at UCLA, who recently
went through the advancement process, but wishes to remain anonymous, it appears that diversity
statements are not being required with any real rigor in this process.
213. Letter from Robert C. May, Chair of Academic Council, U.C. to Michael Brown, Provost,
and Academic Senate Division Chairs, UC, 1 (Feb. 25, 2019), https://senate.universityofcalifornia.
edu/_files/reports/rm-mb-divchairs-use-of-dei-statements.pdf.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 3–4.
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diversity, equity, and inclusion, especially as they related to underrepresented
groups in higher education.” 216 In addition, these recommendations expressly
state that “[l]ife experiences may be an important aspect” of the evaluation of
contributions to diversity, which, as will later be discussed, opens up the door
for consideration of an applicant’s own race or gender. 217 This document also
recommends a separate “written assessment of the proposed faculty hire’s
awareness, record, and future plans to advance diversity, equity, and
inclusion.” 218 In other words, if these policies were adopted, all UC schools
would move much closer to treating a diversity statement as an independent
“fourth leg” of evaluation. 219 Finally, and most controversially, this document
would require that all current faculty be evaluated for contributions to diversity,
preferable “through a DEI statement that foregrounds and makes explicit DEI
contributions to research, teaching, and/or service.” 220 In light of that
recommendation, the assurances that “DEI statements do not represent a new
criterion for evaluation” do not seem particularly reassuring. 221
This final recommendation also appears to have been adopted without full
consultation with the University Committee on Academic Personnel, which thus
far has not embraced the requirement that current faculty be evaluated for
According to the Academic Council,
contributions to diversity. 222
“contributions to diversity are not mandatory” and “individuals lacking a
diversity profile will not be held back.” 223 The battle between diversity officers
and the faculty will likely continue over the next few years, which may limit
how quickly these changes are adopted. 224
216. Id. at 3.
217. Id.; see infra Section II.A.1.
218. UCAADE & EO/AA, supra note 213, at 4.
219. See Acad. Council, Minutes of Meeting, UC ACAD. SENATE 7 (July 25, 2018),
https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/committees/council/council-7-25-18-minutes.pdf
(recommending reopening debate on whether to add diversity as a “fourth criterion for promotion
and tenure”). But cf. Letter from Mary Gilly, supra note 207 (noting that efforts to promote
diversity should “not be understood as constituting a ‘fourth leg’ of evaluation”).
220. UCAADE & EO/AA, supra note 213, at 4.
221. Id.
222. Acad. Council, Minutes of Meeting, UC ACAD. SENATE 2 (Jan. 23, 2019),
https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/committees/council/council-1-23-19-minutes.pdf
(“UCAADE Chair Siu noted that UCAADE revised recommendation 6 to clarify that academic
reviews will not require DEI statements. Supporting language was also added to clarify that
recommendation 6 is consistent with existing language in APM 210-1-d; that exceptional
contributions to DEI may warrant additional recognition as aspects of research, teaching, and/or
service, but that DEI statements do not represent a fourth criterion for evaluation; and that campuses
may determine the best format for the submission of statements.”).
223. Id. (“The intent of the recommendations is to raise awareness, and to regularize and
highlight existing APM language, which is clear that contributions to diversity are not mandatory,
but can help enhance and boost a file; individuals lacking a diversity profile will not be held back.”).
224. Mona Lynch, UCAADE Chair, recently urged the Faculty Senate to “to take diversity
contributions seriously in promotion and tenure reviews, and apply consistent use of the
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But those advocating for an increased role for diversity statements at UC
Schools have found another, even more effective mechanism to rapidly
accelerate their use. Since 2015, the California legislature has been offering
grant funding for programs aimed at increasing faculty diversity. 225
Accordingly, the Office of the President (UCOP) has been issuing RFPs
(Requests for Proposals) for Advancing Faculty Diversity Recruitment. 226
These programs come from the individual campuses “through each campus’
Office of the Provost/Executive Vice Chancellor,” and, therefore, bypass the
need to get the faculty senate on board with a policy. 227 Campuses are
encouraged to develop increasingly radical diversity programs in order to qualify
for up to a half million dollars of funding per proposal. 228 The pilot programs
that have received this funding have focused on a variety of approaches, some
of which are unobjectionable, such as extending additional mentoring to
minority faculty hires. 229 But several schools—including UC Davis, UC Santa
Cruz, UC Berkeley, and UC Riverside—have focused on an expanded use of
mandatory diversity statements as a central part of their pilot programs. 230 These
pilot programs have thus far featured several innovations.
First, diversity statements are treated as a threshold requirement for
consideration. If an applicant’s statement falls short, then the applicant will no
longer be considered. At UC Davis, for instance, those evaluating candidates
were told that, “[n]o one crosses into threshold unless they look outstanding with
statements.” Acad. Council, Minutes of Meeting, UC ACAD. SENATE 6 (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/committees/council/council-9-25-19-minutes.pdf.
225. Letter from Susan L. Carlson, Acting Provost, Exec. Vice President Acad. Affairs, to
Exec. Vice Chancellors/Provosts, UC at 2 (June 7, 2019), https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_
files/advancing-faculty-diversity-rfp/afd-recruitment-rfp.pdf.
226. Id. at 2.
227. Id. at 3.
228. Id. at 2.
229. UCOP is required to issue an annual legislative report, which provides critical insights
into the programs that have been approved and their outcomes. UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
FINAL REPORT ON THE 2016–2017 USE OF ONE-TIME FUNDS TO SUPPORT BEST PRACTICES IN
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN FACULTY EMPLOYMENT 5 (Nov. 2017),
https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_files/reports/adv-fac-div-2016-17-final-leg-report.pdf.
230. This is the list of searches that have used or are currently using this methodology:
UC Berkeley - Engineering 2017-2018; Life Sciences 2018-2019:
UC Davis - Eight open discipline hires (one in each college/school) 2018-2019; School of Medicine
2019-2020 or 2020-2021; The College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences 2019-2020 or
2020-2021; The College of Engineering 2019-2020 or 2020-2021.
UC Riverside - Mathematics 2018-2019; Engineering 2018-2019; Physical Sciences 2019-2020 or
2020-2021.
UC San Francisco- Biomedical Sciences 2017-2018.
UC Santa Cruz- Arts 2019-2020 or 2020-2021; Engineering 2019-2020 or 2020-2021; Global and
Community Health Program in the divisions of Physical and Biological Sciences and Social
Sciences 2019-2020 or 2020-2021.
UC San Diego- Division of Physical Science (including Departments of Mathematics, Chemistry,
and Physics) 2017-2020.
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regard to their contributions to diversity.” 231 Moreover, evaluators were told to
set a “high bar” and to eliminate any candidate that receives a low score on any
of the elements of the diversity statement. 232 Or as UC Davis put it in its outward
promotional material for the program: “Only those candidates with a strong and
compelling Statement of Contributions to Diversity will move forward in the
evaluation process.” 233
Relatedly, diversity statements are now the first, and perhaps the only, thing
that a reviewer will see. 234 Thus, a reviewing panel will no longer have a holistic
picture of the applicant when they evaluate the diversity statement. This is a key
feature of the search process rather than a bug. The UC Davis Provost/Vice
Chancellor Ralph Hexter spoke at a conference on faculty diversity in April
2019, and explained that “[t]he game-changer is that, in these searches, it is the
candidate’s diversity statement that is considered first; only those who submit
persuasive and inspiring statements can advance for complete consideration.” 235
This is not a toothless requirement. For instance, in a pilot program at UC
Berkeley in Life Sciences, all but 214 of 893 qualified applicants were
eliminated because their diversity statement did not meet the school’s “high
standard.” 236 In other words, seventy-six percent of qualified applicants were
rejected without even considering their teaching skills, their publication history,
their potential for academic excellence, or their ability to contribute to their field.
As far as the university knew, these applicants could have well been the next
Albert Einstein or Jonas Salk, or they might have been outstanding and
innovative educators who would make a significant difference in students’ lives.
At UC Davis, in some departments over fifty percent of the applicants were
eliminated using this same methodology. 237 In addition, the initial review of
diversity statements is increasingly being shifted away from academic faculty
members and towards administrators. 238
231. Office of the Vice Provost – Academic Affairs, Orientation Presentation PowerPoint (Jan.
2019) (attached as Appendix A).
232. Id.
233. Advancing Faculty Diversity Grant, 2018–2019, UC DAVIS, https://
academicaffairs.ucdavis.edu/advancing-faculty-diversity-pilot-project (last visited Dec. 5, 2020).
234. Orientation Presentation PowerPoint, supra note 231.
235. Conference Notes on file with author.
236. Rebecca Heald & Mary Wildermuth, Initiative to Advance Faculty Diversity, Equity and
Inclusion in the Life Science at UC Berkeley Year End Summary Report: 2018–2019, UC
BERKELEY, https://ofew.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/life_sciences_inititatve.year_end_report_
summary.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2021).
237. Letter from Ralph J. Hexter, Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor, to the U.C. Davis
Academic Senate (Jan. 17, 2020), https://651d7eef-05d1-4785-8f04-93b49cc8d71f.filesusr.com/
ugd/257e28_99034734731c4b748f6c7df78005bb99.pdf.
238. For instance, seven of the UC campuses now have Equity Advisor programs, and six
provide stipends to these advisors. Acad. Council, Minutes of Meeting, UC ACAD. SENATE 2 (June
26, 2019), https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/committees/council/council-6-26-19minutes.pdf. These advisors are “tenured faculty or senior staff members selected by a committee
of faculty and administrators involved in diversity and equity issues.” Id. The Faculty Senate has
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Some of these programs are also employing a very narrow definition of
diversity. For instance, the UC Davis pilot program focused solely on
“commitment to the advancement of diversity, equity, and inclusion for
underrepresented minority students and groups (African-American, Latino
(a)/Chicano (a)/Hispanic, and Native American).” 239 At UC Santa Cruz,
applicants are evaluated on whether they “demonstrate an understanding of the
barriers facing women and people of color” rather than any other types of
diversity. 240 In contrast, some other UC schools have continued to emphasize a
broad and multifaceted definition of diversity. 241
Perhaps most troubling of all has been the development of particularly
aggressive rubrics that expressly discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. While
originally diversity statements were seen as a plus factor in hiring or admission,
the development of scoring rubrics at schools such as UC Davis, Berkeley, and
Santa Cruz has pushed the evaluation of these statements in a different and much
more radical direction. These rubrics now include things an applicant could say
that would result in a low or failing score. For instance, a candidate who
“[d]efines diversity only in terms of different areas of study or different
nationalities, but doesn’t discuss gender or ethnicity/race” would get a low score,
as would a candidate who “[m]ay discount the importance of diversity” or
“[m]ay provide reasons for not considering diversity in hiring, or sees it as
antithetical to academic freedom or the university’s research mission.” 242
Similarly, at UC Berkeley or UC Santa Cruz, a candidate who “may state that
it’s better not to have outreach or affinity groups aimed at underrepresented
individuals because it keeps them separate from everyone else, or will make
them feel less valued” would get a low score on their awareness of diversity

expressed concern that these equity advisors may come to be seen as “overseers” rather than
advisors. Id.
239. Open Rank Faculty Position in Public Health Sciences, UC DAVIS: RECRUIT, https://
recruit.ucdavis.edu/JPF03925 (last visited Feb. 16, 2021).
240. Physical and Biological Sciences: Biomedical Sciences—Assistant Professors, UC
SANTA CRUZ: RECRUIT, https://recruit.ucsc.edu/JPF00756 (stating that “[i]nitial screening of
candidates will be based on statements of contributions to diversity, equity, and inclusion”).
241. UC’s Regents Policy 4400 defines diversity broadly: “Diversity—a defining feature of
California’s past, present, and future—refers to the variety of personal experiences, values, and
worldviews that arise from differences of culture and circumstance. Such differences include race,
ethnicity, gender, age, religion, language, abilities/disabilities, sexual orientation, gender identity,
socioeconomic status, and geographic region, and more.” Bd. of Regents, Regents Policy 4400:
Policy on University of California Diversity Statement, UC (Sept. 16, 2010), https://regents.
universityofcalifornia.edu/governance/policies/4400.html.
242. Rubric to Assess Candidate Contributions to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, UC
BERKLEY [hereinafter Berkley Rubric], https://ofew.berkeley.edu/recruitment/contributionsdiversity/rubric-assessing-candidate-contributions-diversity-equity. (last visited Mar. 10, 2021);
Criteria for Scoring URM = African-Americans, Latin(x)/Hispanics, and Native Americas, UC
IRVINE (on file with author).
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issues. 243 Moreover, applicants are expected to not merely embrace generalized
expectations such as treating all students equally or mentoring a diverse pool of
students. Achieving such generalized requirements would only earn an
applicant a middling and likely failing score. 244
A faculty member’s research focus can also play an important role in the
evaluation. For instance, both UC Berkley and UC Santa Cruz would give a
high score on work done to advance “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” to faculty
members who are “applying their research skills or expertise to investigating
diversity, equity and inclusion.” 245
Emboldened by their success, UC campuses are dramatically expanding the
use of the pilot methodology. UC Santa Cruz recently announced that in 2019,
one-third of faculty searches will be part of their pilot program where “search
committees will first review and assess candidates’ statements on contributions
to diversity, equity, and inclusion before determining whether to evaluate the
rest of the application materials.” 246 UC Davis is expanding this approach to
“approved searches planned for the 2019–20 academic year.” 247
Many of these policies, such as the scoring of diversity statements prior to the
rest of the application, are now being recommended as “new best practices for
faculty searches.” 248 Similarly, faculty members are encouraged to “require
applicants to achieve a scoring cutoff to be considered.” 249 It appears that the
same rubrics developed for such pilot programs are being held out as a model to
be used for all faculty applicants. 250 It seems only a matter of time before the
innovations in the use of diversity statements from these pilot programs is
243. Berkley Rubric; UCSC Starting Rubric to Assess Candidate Contributions to Diversity,
Equity, and Inclusion, UC SANTA CRUZ [hereinafter UCSC Rubric] https://apo.ucsc.edu/policy/
communications/docs/ucsc-rubrics-c2deistatements.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
244. Berkley Rubric, supra note 242; UCSC Rubric, supra note 243; see also infra Section
II.A.2 and accompanying text.
245. Berkley Rubric, supra note 242; UCSC Rubric, supra note 243.
246. Scott Hernandez-Jason, Faculty Diversity, Retention Supported by New Grants, UC
SANTA CRUZ: NEWSCENTER (Nov. 1, 2019), https://news.ucsc.edu/2019/11/faculty-diversitygrants.html.
247. UC Office of the President, 2019–2021 Advancing Faculty Diversity: Preliminary Report,
UC (Dec. 2019), https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_files/reports/adv-fac-div-2019-21-pre
lim-leg-report.pdf.
248. Email from Philip H. Kass, Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, UC Davis (on file with
author); see also Letter from Ralph J. Hexter, Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor, to the Deans,
UC DAVIS (June 13, 2019), https://651d7eef-05d1-4785-8f04-93b49cc8d71f.filesusr.com/ugd/
257e28_3839c3707ec242de8862478af8cb414b.pdf.
249. Letter from Ralph J. Hexter, supra note 248.
250. A report prepared for the Academic and Student Affairs Committee described UC
Berkeley as piloting “new guidelines for using these statements to evaluate candidates at all levels
of decision-making.” Discussion Item from the Office of the President, to Members of the Acad.
and Student Affairs Comm., Accountability Sub-Report on Diversity: Faculty Diversity Outcomes,
UC 19 (Sept. 26, 2018), https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/sept18/a2.pdf.
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imported in full into all faculty hiring decisions, and even to all retention, tenure,
and advancement decisions.
A. Four Key Issues
As described above, the development of mandatory diversity statements at UC
raises at least four significant issues. First, mandatory diversity statements can
be used as a backdoor way to consider the race, gender, or other protected
characteristics of applicants. Second, mandatory diversity statements allow for
viewpoint discrimination against a professor’s personal viewpoint. Third,
mandatory diversity statements allow for discrimination in favor of certain kinds
of academic research at the exclusion of others. Fourth, mandatory diversity
statements require not merely agreement with the universities stated policies, but
full-throated support.
1. Use of Race/Gender
First, mandatory diversity statements may serve as a backdoor way for the
consideration of race and gender in the hiring process. This is a particularly
salient issue in states like California or Michigan where the voters have enacted
restrictions against affirmative action programs. This issue is largely outside of
the scope of this article, and so it will only be addressed briefly.
In the face of the Supreme Court precedent banning race-based quotas, and
the enactment of anti-affirmative action measures, such as California’s
Proposition 209, administrative supporters of diversity initiatives have
increasingly become more creative in their efforts to develop facially neutral
programs that nevertheless achieve the goal of increasing diversity 251 In 1996,
California voters enacted Proposition 209, which banned the consideration of
race and gender in higher education. 252 Since then, administrators have sought

251. These programs proliferate even though internal data shows that UC is currently
outshining most of its competitor institutions in diversity hiring by hiring well above national
availabilities, and even though projections indicate that without any further interventions the
percentage of minorities on the UC faculty “will likely match recent national availabilities as early
as 2025.” Id. at 12. In fact, “compared to peer research institutions, UC places 3rd in terms of
gender balance and 2nd in terms of URM faculty diversity.” Shane White, Academic Senate Chair,
Remarks to the University of California Board of Regents: Towards a More Diverse Faculty (May
2018), https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/resources/regents-remarks/may-2018-regent
s-remarks.pdf.
252. California Proposition 209, Affirmative Action Initiative (1996), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_209,_Affirmative_Action_Initiative_(1996).
In
2020, voters in California rejected an effort to repeal Proposition 209. California Proposition 16,
Repeal Proposition 209 Affirmative Action Amendment (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.
org/California_Proposition_16,_Repeal_Proposition_209_Affirmative_Action_Amendment_(202
0).
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ways to continue to take race and gender into account in ways that will be
“invisible to outsiders.” 253
Diversity statements have been one of the more ingenious innovations of this
initiative. 254 Increasing faculty diversity is one of the key rationales for using
mandatory diversity statements. In UC, these statements are touted as a way to
“increase the diversity of the applicant pool[]” despite the limitations of
Proposition 209. 255 Terms like “diverse students” or “underrepresented
students” are thinly veiled “euphemisms” for race and ethnicity. 256 These
faculty diversity hiring initiatives are being measured expressly (and solely)
based on whether more woman and minorities are being hired as a result of these
policies. 257
253. HEATHER MAC DONALD, THE DIVERSITY DELUSION: HOW RACE AND GENDER
PANDERING CORRUPT THE UNIVERSITY AND UNDERMINE OUR CULTURE 35, 39 (2018).
254. UC’s Office of General Counsel expressly links the use of diversity statements to the goal
of getting around the limits of Proposition 209.
Proposition 209 prohibits UC from discriminating against or granting preferential
treatment to individuals based on race, ethnicity, gender, or national origin. However,
diversity remains a central part of UC’s mission, and while Prop 209 eliminated some
prior diversity tools, UC still has many strategies available for addressing race and gender
equity in academic programs that comply with Prop 209. UCOP has compiled many of
these strategies in a set of guidelines. Strategies in the area of faculty diversity include
recognizing and rewarding diversity contributions in appointment and advancement,
requesting a diversity statement from candidates, diversifying search committees, and
incentivizing departments for increasing diversity.
Minutes of Meeting, UC ACAD. SENATE, supra note 219, at 4.
Other innovations include the President’s Postdoctoral Fellowship Program where postdoctoral
scholars with a “demonstrated record of commitment to diversity” are hired as fellows and then
departments are provided incentives to hire from this program for full-time faculty positions.
Accountability Sub-Report on Diversity, supra note 250, at 6.
255. Guidelines for Enhancing Diversity at UC in the Context of Proposition 209, UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA 1, 7 (Sept. 2016), https://diversity.universityofcalifornia.edu/files/documents/
prop-209-summary.pdf.
256. This is acknowledged even by supporters of affirmative action policies who are critical of
the use of such “euphemisms.” See Lindsey Malcom-Piqueux, Taking Equity-Minded Action to
Close Equity Gaps, PEER REV. (Spring 2017), https://www.aacu.org/peerreview/2017/Spring/
Malcom-Piqueux.
257. UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL REPORT ON THE 2016-17 USE OF ONE-TIME FUNDS
TO SUPPORT BEST PRACTICES IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN FACULTY EMPLOYMENT
3–5 (Nov. 2017), https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_files/reports/adv-fac-div-2016-17-finalleg-report.pdf (evaluating the pilot programs exclusively based on how well they attracted women
and minority applicants); UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL REPORT ON THE 2017−18 USE OF
ONE-TIME FUNDS TO SUPPORT BEST PRACTICES IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN
FACULTY EMPLOYMENT 2–3, 5 (Dec. 2018), https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_files/report
s/adv-fac-div-2017-18-final-leg-report.pdf; Orientation Presentation PowerPoint, supra note 231,
at 5 (focusing on “the success of avid use of the diversity statement and valuaing contributions to
diversity in the selection process on attracting females and URMs); Accountability Sub-Report on
Diversity, supra note 250, at 15 (“With this $6 million, UC has been able to support a coordinated
systemwide program by awarding these funds on a competitive basis to support new efforts to
increase LRE faculty diversity in selected units.”).
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Departments are given strong incentives to consider and hire more minority
students. 258 The racial and gender composition of every search pool is
scrutinized. 259 An applicant pool that is inadequately diverse may be rejected
by administrators and a department may be required to prolong its search. 260
Campuses that develop innovative approaches to increase diversity hiring are
able to receive precious funding from the Advancing Faculty Diversity grants
discussed above.
Given all of the incentives for minority hiring, it is striking that faculty
considering diversity are allowed to take into account “a candidates’ stated life
experiences” when grading diversity statements. 261 With the express directive
to diversify, it is natural to think that faculty members will evaluate statements
based on the race or gender or other characteristics of the applicant. Indeed,
sample statements provided to faculty members serving on a search committee
258. For instance, faculties are strongly incentivized to hire participants in the President’s
Postdoctoral Fellowship Program (“PPFP”). For each PPFP hire, the university gives the campus
$85,000 per year for a five year period. Janet Napolitano, President University of California, Letter
regarding PPFP incentives (July 18, 2019), https://ppfp.ucop.edu/info/documents/hiring-incentiveletter.6.18.14.pdf. Such PPFP candidates can also qualify for a search waiver, which greatly
expedites the hiring process and saves departments needed resources. Email from Philip H. Kass,
Vice Provost of Academic Affairs, UC Davis, President’s Postdoctoral and Chancellors’
Fellowship Program faculty hiring incentive (Jul. 31, 2019) (on file with author).
259. UC Berkeley requires new searches to expressly consider “how many women and
underrepresented minorities have applied for past positions in your department or school, as a
percentage of the total applicant pool” and to “redefin[e] departmental or school evaluation
systems” if women or minorities are not hired. UC BERKELEY, OFFICE FOR FACULTY EQUITY AND
WELFARE, SEARCH GUIDE FOR SENATE FACULTY RECRUITMENTS: POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND
PRACTICES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://ofew.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/senate_search_guide.pdf.
260. UC Davis encourages search committees to “ensure that qualified women and minorities
are well represented in the applicant pool”, and states that “[r]equests may be denied or modified .
. . if the proposed tenured level recruitment would significantly reduce the diversity of the applicant
pool.” OFFICE OF ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, UC DAVIS, RECRUITMENT SECTION UCD-500 (June 9,
2011)
https://academicaffairs.ucdavis.edu/sites/g/files/dgvnsk2376/files/inlinefiles/UCD%20500.pdf. In her book the Diversity Delusion, Heather Mac Donald recounts one
particularly stark example:
“Thus it was that UC San Diego’s electrical and computer engineering department a few
years later found itself facing a mandate from campus administrators to hire a fourth
female professor. The possibility of a new hire had opened up—a rare opportunity in
that budget climate—and after winnowing down hundreds of applicants, the department
put forward its top candidates for on-campus interviews. Scandalously, all were male.
Word came down from on high that a female applicant who hadn’t even been close to
making the initial cut must be interviewed. She was duly brought to campus for an
interview, but she got mediocre reviews. The powers-that-be then spoke again: Her
candidacy must be brought to a departmental vote. In an unprecedented assertion of
secrecy, the department chair refused to disclose the vote’s outcome and insisted on a
second ballot. After that second vote, the authorities finally gave up and dropped her
candidacy. Both vote counts remained secret.”
MAC DONALD, supra note 253, at 175–76.
261. Orientation Presentation PowerPoint, supra note 231, at 21.
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expressly disclosed an applicant’s own racial or ethnic background: One model
statement notes that the applicant “left India at 18 years old to attend school in
England.” 262 Another is even more explicit: “I am a Mexican-American” the
first sentence reads. 263 The same pattern holds for a series of sample diversity
statements from UC San Diego. “As a woman in the sciences” one statement
reads, “[a]s a Latino immigrant who lived in X, Y, and the United States” says
another, and so on. 264 It is no wonder that UC’s Academic Writing Center
encourages applicants to “explain how your experiences as part of an
underrepresented group in your field has impacted you[.]” 265 If these are the
model statements that students are encouraged to emulate and faculty members
are encouraged to take into account when evaluating statements, then many
female or minority applicants for faculty positions will likely expressly identify
that in their statements. 266 Faculty members will likely give in to the pressure
to increase diversity by favoring applicants based on the applicants own
expressed diversity.
The evidence so far from the pilot programs at UC shows that the aggressive
use of diversity statements has succeeded beyond even the wildest expectations
of the diversity bureaucrats. In 2018−2019, UC Davis conducted eight searches
using diversity statements as an initial cut-off requirement. 32.7% of applicants
for these positions were minorities compares to 9.3% of applicants for all other
positions at UC Davis. 267 This likely reflects aggressive outreach to expand the
diversity of the pool, as well as the emphasis placed in promotion of these
searched on racial diversity. From total applicants to finalists, the pilot program
262. Orientation Presentation PowerPoint, supra note 231, at 19.
263. Id. at 20.
264. UC San Diego, Six Examples of Submitted Diversity Statements (redacted),
https://physicalsciences.ucsd.edu/_files/examples-submitted-diversity-statements.pdf.
265. See Academic Writing Center, Writing a Diversity Statement for Academic Job
Applicantion, UNIV. OF CAL. (Oct. 2018), https://www.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/aess/docs/AWC/
graduatehandouts/Diversity%20Statement%20(Accessible)%20%20.pdf.
266. One 2014 study suggested that less than a quarter of applicants making diversity
statements at one particular university engaged in self-identification. Sara L. Beck, Developing
and Writing a Diversity Statement, VAND. UNIV. CTR. FOR TEACHING (2018),
https://cft.vanderbilt.edu/guides-sub-pages/developing-and-writing-a-diversity-statement/. Beck
suggests that fear of implicit bias may weigh against disclosing personal identity. Id. But it seems
likely that some of the features of the UC pilot programs will make self-disclosure more likely,
since applicants will know that these statements will be evaluated independently and will be aware
of the strong incentives in place in favor of advancing more minority applicants.
The existence of implicit bias is highly contested. See generally Heather Mac Donald, Are We All
Unconscious Racists?, CITY J. (Autumn 2017), https://www.city-journal.org/html/are-we-allunconscious-racists-15487.html. There is nevertheless a bit of irony in the fact that the proponents
of diversity statements are also the most avid proponents of the contested theory of implicit bias.
267. UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL REPORT ON THE 2018−2019 USE OF ONE-TIME
FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE BEST PRACTICES IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN FACULTY
EMPLOYMENT, 22 (Dec. 2019), https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_files/reports/adv-fac-div2018-19-final-leg-report.pdf.
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pool jumped to 82.1% minority compared to a decrease to 5.7% for all other
searches. 268 This represents the application of the diversity statement screening.
It is hard to believe that this degree of seemingly systematic elimination of White
and Asian applicants could have happened without consideration of the
applicants’ own racial or ethnic experiences. Finally, a full 100% of the eight
hires were ultimately underrepresented minorities compared to only 2.3% of the
other hires at UC Davis that year. 269 Such dramatic results are unlikely to be
coincidental especially given the incentive and the institutional support to
engage in racial discrimination.
2. Discrimination based on professorial viewpoint
Mandatory diversity statements have been heavily critiqued as the “new
loyalty oath.” 270 Jeffrey Flier, the former dean of Harvard University’s medical
school said that these statements are an “affront to academic freedom” that
“diminishes the true value of diversity, equity of inclusion by trivializing it.” 271
Flier further declared that “[s]uch requirements risk introducing a political
litmus test into faculty hiring and reviews.” 272 The Oregon Association of
Scholars has noted that “[w]hile in theory, the concepts of diversity, equity, and
inclusion could be interpreted in ways consistent with different political
viewpoints, in practice they have been consistently and exclusively defined by
university officials to emphasize the values and assumptions of left-wing
viewpoints in society.” 273

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. John O. McGinnis, The University of California’s New Loyalty Oath, L. & LIBERTY (Oct.
30, 2018), https://www.lawliberty.org/2018/10/30/the-university-of-californias-new-loyalty-oath/;
Michael Tennant, “Diversity Statements:” Academia’s New Loyalty Oath, THE NEW AM. (Apr. 30,
2019),
https://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/education/item/32153-diversity-statementsacademia-s-new-loyalty-oath. See also Christian Schneider, Secular universities now demand a
‘profession of faith’, N.Y. POST (Apr. 26, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/04/26/secularuniversities-now-demand-a-profession-of-faith/; Max Diamond, Pledging Allegiance to Diversity,
and to the Tenure for Which It Stands, REAL CLEAR INVESTIGATIONS (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2018/10/18/i_pledge_allegiance_to_diversity_an
d_to_the_tenure_for_which_it_stands.html; Mark J. Perry, Quotation of the day on university
corruption and the lack of diversity when it comes to ideology, AM. ENTER. INST. (Mar. 27, 2019),
https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/quotation-of-the-day-on-university-corruption-and-the-lack-ofdiversity-when-it-come-to-ideology/; Ortner, supra note 12.
271. Colleen Flaherty, Making a Statement on Diversity Statements, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov.
12,
2018),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/11/12/former-harvard-deans-tweetagainst-required-faculty-diversity-statements-sets-debate.
272. Flier, supra note 12.
273. OR. ASS’N OF SCHOLARS, supra note 198.
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On the other hand, supporters of diversity statements have declared that those
expressing these fears are “scaremongering” 274 and that diversity statements will
only ensure that faculty members are equipped to handle the growing diversity
of students in their classrooms. 275
Despite the well-intended defenders, there are reasons to believe that the
critics’ fears are well-founded.
For one thing, the proponents of these statements have been the most willing
to express the position that contrary views have no place on the university
campus. For instance, Tanya Golash-Boza, a Professor of Sociology at
University of California Merced, wrote a piece in Inside Higher Ed entitled “The
Effective Diversity Statement.” 276 In that article, Golash-Boza emphasizes that
applicants who “do not care about diversity and equity” should not “waste [their]
time” applying for academic positions at universities with such a demand. 277
She further notes that while “many faculty members overtly reject campus
efforts to enhance diversity and equity,” these statements are being carefully
read by faculty members that care about these topics. Golash-Boza also
encourages applicants to “acknowledge your privilege” and to focus on
“commonly recognized form[s] of oppression” like “racial oppression, sexism,
homophobia, transphobia, [and] ableism.” 278 Another guide on diversity
statements encourages applicants to avoid “inappropriate examples” such as
“[p]erpetuating the idea that we are all equal - including in regard to access and
potential for success.” 279
Furthermore, the very idea of a diversity statement is rooted in theories that
rely on contested notions such as “critical race theory.” As Professor Flier has
explained,
One way to understand the problem is to examine the academic
literature regarding equity and inclusion today. This literature, though
not uniform, often incorporates key elements of a theoretical corpus
known as “critical race theory,” little known to many academics
outside of the social sciences and the humanities. It emphasizes
274. See Canning & Reddick, supra note 12. The authors nevertheless acknowledge the risk
of the “bureaucratization of diversity” if diversity statements “ask faculty members . . . to toe a line
or embrace a single ideology.” Id.
275. Id.; see also Carmen Mitchell, Why Colleges Should Require Faculty Diversity
Statements, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2018/
11/15/benefits-faculty-diversity-statements-opinion (“So why go further and require an EDI
[equity, diversity, and inclusion] statement? Because faculty members also play a role in fostering
an inclusive environment through teaching and scholarship.”).
276. Tanya Golash-Boza, The Effective Diversity Statement, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 10,
2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2016/06/10/how-write-effective-diversity-state
ment-essay.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Diversity Statements, INDIANA UNIV. BLOOMINGTON CTR. FOR INNOVATIVE TEACHING
AND LEARNING, https://citl.indiana.edu/programs/ai-support/resources/diversity-statements.html.

558

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70:515

structural racism, white privilege and supremacy, microaggressions,
economically driven power relationships, and intersectionality. At the
level of policy, it favors “race conscious” rather than “color blind”
approaches to remedies . . . But it is obvious that these ideas and policy
frameworks are not politically neutral. Rather, they map onto the
left/progressive wing of the political spectrum, and their claims are
arguable and highly contested. This ideological context is hardly
subtle[.] 280
The very concepts of “diversity” and “equity” are, therefore, not politically
neutral or immune from debate. As one article on diversity published by the
Association of American Colleges & Universities puts it, “equity-mindedness”
requires “race-consciousness” and the embrace of explicit affirmative action
programs. 281 As another article explains, “[e]quity-minded individuals are . . .
color-conscious” as well as “[w]illing to assume responsibility for the
elimination of inequality.” 282
Supporters of this doctrine of diversity are quick to vilify those who disagree
with them. For instance, Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva in his influential
Racism without Racists explains that the concept of colorblindness is part of a
“racial ideology” that is imposed by majority racial groups in order to perpetuate
power dynamics and preserve the racial status quo. 283 Bonilla-Silva refers to
concepts of equal treatment and colorblindness as types of “abstract liberalism,”
which “ignore[s] the multiple institutional and state-sponsored practices behind
segregation and being unconcerned about these practices’ negative
consequences for minorities.” 284 But Bonilla-Silva’s theory has many critics as
well. For instance, Professor John Staddon has argued that this framework of
colorblind racism relies on faulty assumptions and a lack of any empirical
evidence. 285
Thus, diversity statement rubrics engage in viewpoint discrimination when
they penalize candidates who “[m]ay provide reasons for not considering
diversity in hiring, or sees it as antithetical to academic freedom or the

280. Flier, supra note 12.
281. Lindsey Malcom-Piqueux, supra note 256.
282. See also Estela Mara Bensimon, Alicia C. Dowd & Keith Witham, Five Principles for
Enacting Equity by Design, 19 DIVERSITY & DEMOCRACY (Winter 2016), https://www.aacu.org/
diversitydemocracy/2016/winter/bensimon (explaining that “equity” required “accounting for
differences in individual attributes and experiences for the purposes of achieving equal outcomes”).
283. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 2–3 (4th ed. 2018).
284. Id. at 56.
285. John Staddon, The New Racism, Part I: How ‘Race and Ethnic Studies’ Made Color
Blindness a Bad Thing, JAMES G. MARTIN CTR. FOR ACAD. RENEWAL (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2018/08/the-new-racism-part-1-how-race-and-ethnic-studiesmade-color-blindness-a-bad-thing/; See Thomas Sowell, “Affirmative Action”: A Worldwide
Disaster, COMMENT. (Dec. 1989) https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/affirmativeaction-a-worldwide-disaster/.
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university’s research mission” 286 or who “may state that it’s better not to have
outreach or affinity groups aimed at underrepresented individuals because it
keeps them separate from everyone else, or will make them feel less valued.” 287
These statements are squarely being employed on one side of a lingering
academic debate 288 of significant importance for the nature of the academy and
the future of the country. 289
UC Davis Mathematics Chair Abigail Thompson distilled this point very
effectively in a recent essay critiquing the use of mandatory diversity statements:
Why is it a political test? Politics are a reflection of how you believe
society should be organized. Classical liberals aspire to treat every
person as a unique individual, not as a representative of their gender
or their ethnic group. The sample rubric dictates that in order to get a
high diversity score, a candidate must have actively engaged in
promoting different identity groups as part of their professional life.
The candidate should demonstrate “clear knowledge of, experience
with, and interest in dimensions of diversity that result from different
identities” and describe “multiple activities in depth.” Requiring

286. Berkeley Rubric, supra note 242; see supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
287. Id.; Berkeley Rubric, supra note 242.
288. See John Staddon, The Devolution of Social Science, QUILLETTE (Oct. 7, 2018),
https://quillette.com/2018/10/07/the-devolution-of-social-science/.
289. From speaking with those inside the UC system, it is clear that these statements are being
evaluated in a narrow and ideological fashion looking for a particular kind of diversity, rather than
broadly to encompass other types of diversity such as ideological or religious diversity. On his
blog, John Cochrane notes a conversation he had with UC colleagues:
My friends (anonymous!) in the UC system report that the criteria are clear and the word
is out: Don’t try to be clever. Don’t quote Martin Luther King, on judgement by content
of character rather than color of skin. Don’t write vibrant essays on the importance of
ideological, political or religious diversity. Don’t quote federal anti-discrimination law,
the 14th Amendment, and the UC’s own statements of non-discrimination in hiring.
Don’t write about class diversity, diverse experiences of immigrants, such as people born
under communism in Eastern Europe or the amazingly diverse experience of the
colleague you just hired who came from a small village in China. Don’t write about the
importance of freedom on speech, or anti-communist loyalty oaths in the 1950s. Are you
thinking of writing about your hilbilly elegy background, your time in the military, your
support for gun rights and Trump, and how this background and viewpoint would enrich
a faculty and staff that likely has absolutely zero people like you? Don’t bother. We all
know what “diversity” means. And, heaven forbid, don’t express distaste for the project.
The staff are on to all these tricks, and each of these specifically will earn you a
downgrade.
John Cochrane, Wokeademia, THE GRUMPY ECONOMIST: JOHN COCHRANE’S BLOG (Jan. 30,
2020),
https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2020/01/wokeademia.html.
My
personal
conversations with current UC faculty, as well as those who have recently applied to UC are
consistent with what Cochrane writes.
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candidates to believe that people should be treated differently
according to their identity is indeed a political test. 290
3. Discrimination Based on Research Viewpoint
UC’s Guidelines for Evaluating Contributions to Diversity for Faculty
Appointment and Promotion Under APM – 210 set out the kinds of research
endeavors that would give a faculty member credit for a contribution to
diversity. 291
Research contributions to understanding the barriers facing women
and minorities in academic disciplines, for example:
• Studying patterns of participation and advancement of
women and minorities in fields where they are underrepresented
• Studying socio-cultural issues confronting under-represented
students in college preparation curricula
• Evaluating programs, curricula, and teaching strategies
designed to enhance participation of under-represented
students in higher education
Research interests that will contribute to diversity and equal
opportunity, for example, research that addresses:
• Race, ethnicity, gender, multiculturalism, and inclusion
• Health disparities, educational access and achievement,
political engagement, economic justice, social mobility, civil
and human rights
• Questions of interest to communities historically excluded by
higher education
• Artistic expression and cultural production that reflects
culturally diverse communities or voices not well represented
in the arts and humanities 292
290. Thompson, supra note 13, at 1778. In response to the backlash her article engendered,
Thompson further elaborated on this process:
It is a misunderstanding to interpret my essay as an attack on the concepts of diversity
and inclusiveness. There are constructive and destructive ways to achieve these goals.
Some involve being helpful and welcoming, and being thoughtful about opening doors
to the previously excluded. Others are destructive. They require adherence to a very
particular view on identity and social justice. Destructive approaches alienate people
who should be working together towards an inclusive community. Mandatory DEI
statements are divisive and destructive.
John Cochrane, More Wokeademia, THE GRUMPY ECONOMIST (Jan. 31, 2020) https://johnh
cochrane.blogspot.com/2020/01/more-wokeademia.html (quoting an email from Thompson).
291. UCOP Academic Personnel and Programs, Evaluating Contributions to Diversity for
Faculty Appointment and Promotion Under APM – 210, UC SAN DIEGO 1, 4 (Feb. 2017), https://
www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/policies-guidelines/eval-contributions-diversity.pdf.
292. Id.
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It is not hard to see how this list will result in favoritism to certain kinds of
viewpoints at the expense of others. Consider, for instance, a sample EDI
statement provided by UCLA’s Office of Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion. Since
this statement is being offered as a sample or model, it is likely one that would
score highly under UCLA’s criteria. This prospective faculty member
emphasizes that his “research broadly focuses on the socioeconomic, civic, and
political integration of post-1965 immigrants and their children,” and that he
encourages students “through their scholarship and advocacy, to alleviate [] the
vast inequities that continue to shape our world.” 293 This statement is held up
as a model diversity statement.
Imagine, in contrast, a statement written by a sociologist whose research
focuses on how inequality is fundamental to society’s progress and how free
market systems in the long run drastically reduce poverty and improve quality
of life. 294 It is unlikely that this statement would receive a positive score, let
alone be held up as a model for others to emulate.
Or imagine two prospective law professors. One publishes an article strongly
supporting affirmative action programs. Another argues that affirmative action
programs are harmful because they create mismatch and are incompatible with
the ideals of the equal protection clause. The first professor will get a high score
on his contributions to diversity, while the second professor will receive low
marks and may be excluded under the search method being utilized in UC Davis
and elsewhere. In a highly competitive academic marketplace, this process of
giving additional credit to certain kinds of research is likely to skew the academy
even further away from conservative ideas and intellectual diversity.
4. Requirement that all Professors Dedicate Themselves to Contributing to
Diversity
John O. McGinnis has analogized diversity statements to statements of faith
required by Oxford and Cambridge Universities after the English
Reformation. 295 However, as McGinnis insightfully notes, these modern
statements of faith require more than just intellectual assent: “[t]he old
requirement of the British colleges was at least less intrusive. One had to profess
a set of beliefs but did not have to do anything to advance their social realization.
But under the California policy, a prospective faculty member must advance a
designated social mission to advance his or her career.” 296
Take the rubrics used by UC Berkeley and UC Santa Cruz in their Advancing
Faculty Diversity pilot programs. An applicant who “mentions activities that
293. Example EDI Statements, UCLA https://ucla.app.box.com/v/sample-EDI-statements.
294. See e.g. Phillip Aghion, et. al., Innovation and Top Income Inequality, 86 REV. ECON.
STUDIES 1 (2019), (arguing that while innovation can increase income inequality it can also
dramatically increase social mobility); Mark Tovey, The Social Function of Economic Inequality,
MISES INSTITUTE (Dec. 19, 2014), https://mises.org/library/social-function-economic-inequality.
295. See McGinnis, supra note 270.
296. Id.
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are already the expectation of faculty as evidence of commitment and
involvement” such as “always invit[ing] and welcom[ing] students from all
backgrounds to participate in [a] research lab” or being willing to mentor women
or minority students would get a low (likely failing) score on her statement. 297
Nor would faculty members receive credit for “[d]escrib[ing] only activities that
are already the expectation of our faculty such as mentoring, treating all students
the same regardless of background, etc.” 298 So, faculty are expected not only to
fulfill all administrative expectations for their service, but to go beyond that.
Of course, a university may require professors to implement a variety of
diversity related programs and policies. For instance, it may require a professor
to undergo implicit bias training, even if the professor does not accept the
premise of implicit bias. But what UC is doing is different. It is not merely
requiring a professor to embrace university policy, but to be a champion of it. A
professor is not allowed to do the bare minimum, but is expected to go beyond
that and affirmatively embrace the university’s policies on diversity. A
professor who chooses to dedicate his time to other causes that are not seen as
advancing diversity may not even be considered after evaluation of his diversity
statement, regardless of how valuable that service may be to the campus
community or society. 299
III. DIVERSITY STATEMENTS ARE PART OF A LARGER TREND HERALDING THE
NEED FOR GREATER PROTECTION OF PROFESSORIAL FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
As the above discussion shows, mandatory diversity statements pose a unique
threat to faculty diversity of thought. But diversity statements are not the only
emerging threat that faculty face. In recent decades, the academic profession
has undergone significant modifications, which have undermined the power of
the faculty and empowered bureaucrats who prioritize concerns such as diversity
far above values like free speech. Accordingly, this section seeks to place
diversity statements in the context of a variety of other ongoing changes to
academia, which weaken institutional academic freedom protections for
individual professors.
Scholars critical of the free speech claims of individual professors have argued
that academic norms and informal rules like those adopted by the American
297. UCSC Starting Rubric to Assess Candidate Contributions to Diversity, Equity, and
Inclusion, UC SANTA CRUZ, 2 https://apo.ucsc.edu/policy/communications/docs/ucsc-rubrics-c2
deistatements.pdf.
298. Id. at 3.
299. Cochrane, supra note 289.
Suppose you spent all your copious free time as a scientist activating for climate
change, working as a drug addiction counselor, teaching in prisons, or saving
endangered species. None of that counts. Of course if you spent your time as a
Mormon missionary, activating for second amendment rights, or working for
the Federalist society, we know that doesn’t count!
Id.
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Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) are adequate to protect the free
speech rights of faculty members. 300 Whether or not that was ever the case, the
argument seems increasingly outdated in light of these trends. 301
A. More and more decisions are being shifted to bureaucrats who prioritize
“diversity” rather than intellectual freedom.
In the last several decades, academic institutions have increasingly become
bureaucratized as administrative hires dramatically outpace the growth of
faculty. 302 Although not an entirely new phenomenon, 303 this trend has
continued to accelerate.
At the same time, “diversity discourse” has become central to the operation of
Universities. University officials such as deans, presidents, and chancellors are
chosen to a significant degree based on willingness to promote and increase
diversity focused initiatives. 304 There have been few dissenters among the ranks
of the University administration from the consensus in favor of diversity
programs such as affirmative action. 305 On the other hand, faculty has been more
resistant to such efforts. For instance, one 1996 poll “found that 57 percent of
professors at UC-Berkeley” did not believe that their institution should “grant
preference to one applicant over another for admission on the basis of race, sex[,]
or ethnicity.” 306 By contrast, more than two-thirds of the fifteen administrators
surveyed by Lipson at UC-Berkley supported affirmative action programs. 307
These surveys suggest significant disparity between the attitudes of faculty and
administrators towards diversity issues.
Debates over the reason why administrators have so completely embraced a
particular view of diversity are rampant. Some scholars argue that these pro300. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text; infra note 350 and accompanying text.
301. See Neal H. Hutchens et al., Essay: Faculty, the Courts, and the First Amendment, 120
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2016) (“With many faculty increasingly lacking the protections of
tenure, questions and debate abound over the future prospects of faculty independence and
academic freedom.”); Martins, supra note 160, at 690 (“The realities of today’s public colleges
undermine the confidence one should place in university officials to render objective academic
judgments. In many universities, school administrators, rather than academic experts in the relevant
field, are the ones evaluating professor speech.”).
302. GINSBERG, supra note 200, at 27 (noting that while faculty only grew 50% from 19852005, administrators grew 85% and staff 240%).
303. See HENRY ROSOVSKY, THE UNIVERSITY: AN OWNER’S MANUAL 13 (bemoaning that
“the quality of a school is negatively correlated with the unrestrained power of administrators . . .
”).
304. The selection process for Presidents and other administrators is increasingly led by
corporate search firms with little faculty input. Ginsberg, supra note 200, at 5.
305. Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing Diversity: The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action as
Diversity Management at UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, and UT-Madison, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 985,
997 (2007).
306. Id. at 998.
307. Id. at 999.
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diversity administrators have captured the university. 308 Other scholars push
back on the “capture theory” narrative, emphasizing instead that campus
administrators tend to select their profession based on a commitment to diversity
and support for affirmative action and other diversity programs. 309 University
administrators face increased pressure from the media, accreditation agencies,
employers, and other interested parties to increase diversity. 310 There is also a
lingering debate over whether these diversity efforts are genuine or whether
those proposing them do so out of cynical motivation, such as ensuring job
security, 311 or shifting power from the faculty to the administration. 312 Whether
or not the increasing role for “diversity” in University admissions, hiring, and
student and faculty life is seen as a cynical ploy for power, it is nevertheless a
striking and seemingly enduring change.
Regardless of the reason, the growth in the so called “diversity bureaucracy”
is staggering: In 2018, the Economist noted that there are around 175 employees
at the University of California, Berkeley who are classified as “diversity
officials.” 313 The need to comply with regulatory mandates cannot fully account
for this meteoric growth. 314 Bureaucrats now outnumber faculty 2:1 at most
public universities. 315
As more and more functions of the university are shifted to bureaucrats, there
is reason to be concerned as to whether these bureaucrats, many of whom have
no academic background whatsoever, 316 are sufficiently concerned with the First

308. Id. at 1008–09.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1016–17.
311. Id. at 1005. Some affirmative-action critics, such as former UC Regent Ward Connerly,
have suggested that commitment of university officials to diversity is “superficial” and exists “to
give constitutional protection and to justify their budget.” Id. at 1005–06; See also John Staddon,
Diversity and Inclusion of Identity Groups Often Means Uniformity and Exclusion of Ideas, JAMES
G. MARTIN CTR. FOR ACAD. RENEWAL (June 13, 2018) https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2018/06/
diversity-and-inclusion-of-identity-groups-often-means-uniformity-and-exclusion-of-ideas/. This
seems unlikely in the face of decades of dedicated effort to promote diversity programs, and the
ideological litmus test nature of more recent efforts, such as the mandatory diversity statement.
312. Ginsberg, supra note 200, at 101 (“Put simply, university administrators will often
package proposals designed mainly to enhance their own power on campus as altruistic and publicspirited efforts to promote social and political goals, such as equality and diversity, that the faculty
cannot oppose.”). “[U]nder the rubric of diversity, administrators are seeking and finding ways to
enhance their power vis-a-vis the faculty.” Id. at 116.
313. The Rise of Universities Diversity Bureaucrats, THE ECONOMIST: THE ECONOMIST
EXPLAINS (May 8, 2018), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/05/08/therise-of-universities-diversity-bureaucrats.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Dan Berrett, The Fall of the Faculty, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (July 14, 2011), https://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2011/07/14/fall-faculty (interview with Benjamin Ginsberg) (discussing
the shift away from part-time academic deans to full-time administrators without academic
experience).
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Amendment and with professorial academic freedom. 317 Indeed, these
bureaucratic mandates often “make a mockery of the core academic mission.” 318
There is also reason to think that the norms and mores of the growing
bureaucracy have undermined faculty support for freedom of expression. 319 The
bureaucratization of the university has, therefore, led to increased prominence
of individuals who value diversity far more highly than they value open inquiry
and academic freedom.
B. Undermining of Tenure
A related concern is the undermining of the tenure system. For over a century,
tenure has protected faculty from termination for the expression of unpopular
viewpoints. 320 Indeed, it can be said that “[t]enure is the chief guarantor of the
intellectual freedom that makes it possible for faculty members to pursue new
ideas and to teach concepts in the sciences and humanities that fly in the face of
conventionally accepted wisdom.” 321 Those tenured professors that were fired
for speech related activities were, therefore, often the Ward Churchill’s of the
317. Some scholars have argued that “[f]aculty peers . . . sometimes pose a greater threat to the
academic freedom of individual professors” than a government or the university administration.
David M. Rabban, Symposium on Academic Freedom: Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty
Autonomy?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1988). This, of course, may be true with instances of
individual personality conflicts or other clashes. But by and large faculty has greater incentive to
be protective of the rights of other faculty members than administrators. After all, faculty members
may need to rely on the same protections at some point in their career. Moreover, as Greg Lukianoff
has characterized in his Unlearning Liberty, the “[t]he actual regimes of censorship on campus are
put in place primarily by the ever-growing army of administrators” who “present themselves as
benign philosopher-kings.” GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP
AND THE END OF THE AMERICAN DEBATE (2014); See also Henry Reichman, Academic Freedom
and the Common Good: A Review Essay, AAUP J. OF ACAD. FREEDOM, 16−18 (2016),
https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/Reichman_1.pdf; GINSBERG, supra note 200 (“[M]ost
professors view scholarship and teaching as ends and the university as an institutional means or
instrument through which to achieve those ends. For administrators, on the other hand, it is the
faculty’s research and teaching enterprise that is the means and not the end.”).
318. Matthew Abraham, Book Review: The Fall of the Faculty: The Rise of the All
Administrative University, LOGOS, http://logosjournal.com/2016/abraham-2/ (last visited Mar. 27,
2021).
319. JONATHAN R. COLE, STEPHEN COLE & CHRISTOPHER WEISS, Academic Freedom: a Pilot
Study of Faculty Views, in WHO’S AFRAID OF ACAD. FREEDOM 364 (Akeel Bilgrami & Jonathan
R. Cole eds., 2015). The authors stated, “In fact, the unwillingness to accept the idea that speakers
have a right to hurt others, feelings and offend their sensibilities may lead faculty members to think
of academic freedom and free inquiry as just another value of the university without any special
place among this hierarchy of values.” Id. at 366.
320. MICHAEL BÉRUBÉ & JENNIFER RUTH, THE HUMANITIES, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND
ACADEMIC FREEDOM 115–16 (2015) (“With the erosion of the professionalism once
institutionalized by the tenure system . . . the university community has not blossomed into a vibrant
democracy but reverted to the kind of demeaning and resentful culture typical of patronage
systems.”).
321. Churchill was ultimately awarded $1 in damages by a jury for his improper termination.
See GINSBERG, supra note 200, at 156.
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academy—professors known for their especially offensive and controversial
speech. 322 By and large, professors were protected. However, in recent decades,
there has been a dramatic shift away from tenure and towards non-tenured
adjunct or contract professors. 323
This shift has further empowered
administrators and professional staff at the expense of faculty members. 324 Nontenured faculty may also be less protective of academic freedom and freedom of
expression in the academy more generally. 325
C. Bypassing Faculty Governance
At most academic institutions, faculty senates have traditionally played a
major role in university governance and protected faculty speech and due
process rights. 326 That is certainly true in the UC system, but that role is being
undermined. 327
As discussed above, diversity bureaucrats in the UC system have bypassed
the need to dialogue with the Faculty Senate at all through the use of special
diversity pilot programs. Even when the faculty is consulted, their concerns are
being ignored or marginalized. 328 This tendency to bypass the institutions
established to protect professorial speech rights suggests that more robust legal
protections for professors are needed as the institutional forces that kept conflict
between academics and institutions at bay lose their legitimacy and prestige. 329
322. Id. at 155–56.
323. Hutchens, et al., supra note 301, at 1029; Abraham, supra note 318;
That administrators conspire to marginalize the faculty voice, undermine tenure,
and scuttle shared governance principles within their institutions is undoubtedly
true. The move to increasingly rely upon contingent labor gives administrations
yet another way to control the faculty. Since non-tenure-track faculty can be
dismissed at a moment’s notice, administrators do not have to be bothered with
the resistance of the faculty when it comes to changing the curriculum, scuttling
meritorious research, or controlling once-successful programs.
Id.
324. Ginsberg, supra note 200, at 115–16 (“But, while they do not produce much actual
diversity administrative diversity campaigns have given university officials a tool with which to
attack the autonomy of the faculty recruitment and promotion process and, perhaps, the tenure
system itself.”).
325. COLE, supra note 319, at 364.
326. LARRY G. GERBER, DECLINE OF FACULTY GOVERNANCE: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND
THE MODERN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 5–10 (2014).
327. Jason Fertig, Faculty Senate Shrugged, JAMES G. MARTIN CTR. FOR ACAD. RENEWAL
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2016/08/faculty-senate-shrugged/ (“The idea of
a senate representing faculty members is an old one, but in the contemporary university full of
credentialism and administrative bloat, the relevance of that body is questionable.”).
328. See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text.
329. See Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the
Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 146
(2009) (“[W]here shared governance is weak, an institutional view of academic freedom may
empower administrators to make decisions affecting academic matters without building a
consensus among the faculty.”); Larry Hubbell, Thankless But Vital: The Role of the Faculty Senate
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Professorial hiring is an area of particular vulnerability. While faculty
members are likely to be highly protective of other current faculty members,
they are less likely to have regard for those who are not yet hired and are merely
potential hires, and to expend their dwindling institutional capital on preventing
bureaucratic capture of the hiring process. This is perhaps why UC has been
able to implement mandatory diversity statements for faculty hires with such
limited pushback, but has met much more significant resistance in its efforts with
current faculty members. 330
D. Steps outside of the qualifications of a particular discipline.
Traditionally, professors are part of a particular discipline with academic rules
and norms. These norms are ultimately protective of professorial academic
freedom because a professor applying for a position, for tenure, or for
advancement can rely on the application of these intra-disciplinary norms. But
schools like UC Davis have begun instead to utilize open hiring for interdisciplinary positions. 331 This process of interdisciplinary and cluster hiring is
increasingly common in universities as part of diversity hiring efforts. 332 This
shift opens the door for greater subjectivity in the process. Because a single set
of academic norms do not govern, there is more room for diversity bureaucrats
to impose additional viewpoint-based considerations without oversight. 333
Chair,
THOUGHT
&
ACTION
(Fall
2010),
qa16.nea.org/assets/img/PubThoughtAndAction/Hubbelshort.pdf.
A key lesson I learned is that the faculty senate chair must always be cognizant that he
or she is representing the faculty. It is easy to lose sight of this obligation, given the
temptations of the office. If one is an effective faculty senate chair and is
acknowledged to be such by members of the administration, future benefits may
follow—such as a position within the administration, if one so desires. However, one’s
ambition to pursue a career in administration must not soften one’s advocacy of faculty
interests, which may, at times, differ from the interests of the administration and the
trustees. A heightened sense of careerism can easily lead to an overly deferential
approach in dealing with administrators.
Id.
330. See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text.
331. UC DAVIS, supra note 233 (“The searches will be college or school-wide, without
specification of a specific discipline or department, provided that an applicant’s area of expertise
falls within a discipline embodied in the academic unit. The goal of these broad searches is to
attract the widest possible pool of candidates.”).
332. Successful Development of a Faculty Cluster-Hiring Program at NC State University, NC
STATE UNIV., https://facultyclusters.ncsu.edu/creating-a-culture-of-interdisciplinary-excellence/
(last visited Nov. 19, 2021) (employing an “interdisciplinary tenure committee” among other
innovations); Colleen Flaherty, Cluster Hiring and Diversity, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 1, 2015),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/05/01/new-report-says-cluster-hiring-can-leadincreased-faculty-diversity.
333. Rabban, supra note 317, at 1410 (“Peer review helps assure that the decision rests on valid
professional grounds and thus is itself a contribution to academic freedom. When people without
the relevant scholarly background make these judgments, it may become difficult to avoid
suspicions that inappropriate, nonprofessional considerations played a significant role.”).
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Peer review has traditionally been one of the key pillars of robust academic
freedom. 334 By shifting evaluation from peers to inter-disciplinary committees,
or even to non-academic diversity bureaucrats, one of the key safeguards for
professorial academic freedom is lost. 335
An Urban Universities for Health study on Faculty Cluster Hiring for
Diversity and Institutional Climate shows how viewpoint bias may be more
likely to infect such searches. 336 Some of the searches surveyed originate from
offices or committees focused on diversity issues rather than from members of
the faculty. 337 In one instance, “women and diversity ‘allies’ r[a]n the hiring
process.” 338 In other instances, these searches are organized “around specific
disciplines which tend to be more diverse or diversity-related research
topics.” 339 Diversity training for members of the search committee is also a
ubiquitous feature. 340 All of these features make these types of interdisciplinary
searches more likely to focus heavily on diversity and to be less protective of
diversity of opinion. This is exactly what appears to have happened in the
faculty hiring initiatives at UC Davis and Berkeley that were described above.
Similarly, a large wave of cluster hiring at UC Riverside was criticized
because it led to faculty accusations of “administrators [] controlling the
proposal selection process and selecting clusters arbitrarily or, worse, for their
own ends. The massive cluster-hiring initiative also seemed to be overtaking

334. The classic conception of faculty autonomy “rested on the guarantee of quality provided
by disciplinary bodies whose role is to establish and implement norms and standards and so to
certify their members’ professional competence.” Joan W. Scott, Knowledge, Power, and
Academic Freedom, 76 SOC. RSCH. 451, 460 (2009), https://culturahistorica.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/02/scott-knowledge.pdf.
335. In FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, Finkin and Post argue
that academic freedom should be primarily defended on the basis of institutional academic freedom
rather than individual rights. The linchpins for their idealized system of academic freedom include
“the professional norms necessary to define and generate knowledge” and the need for “those who
exercise the prerogative of peer review [to] interpret disciplinary standards in a manner that
maintains the internal legitimacy of these standards.” Because these norms prevail, Finkin and Post
argue that academic institutions must be given the ability to “preserve sufficient social cohesion
within the profession” and to “maintain a sensible and wise equilibrium between innovation and
stability.” Matthew F. Finkin & Robert Post, supra note 137, at 60. Finkin and Post do not reckon
with the extent to which such disciplinary norms have been undermined in the name of mounting
institutional bureaucracy and the forced blurring of disciplinary lines. These trends suggest that
institutional norms academic freedom will become increasingly inadequate to protect free speech
rights without increasing judicial and constitutional intervention. Id.
336. Faculty Cluster Hiring for Diversity and Institutional Climate, URBAN UNIVS. FOR
HEALTH 1, 10 (Apr. 2015), urbanuniversitiesforhealth.org/media/documents/Faculty_
Cluster_Hiring_Report.pdf.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 12.
339. Id.
340. Id.
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established, department-level search procedures.” 341 A majority of the
respondents to a survey related to the program said that “their own departments’
hiring strategies were inconsistent with the cluster strategy” or that “the cluster
strategy interfered with their departments’ strategies.” 342
As these kinds of programs become more common, prospective, or current,
faculty members increasingly will not be protected by the professional norms of
their academic disciplines, suggesting a greater need for constitutional
protection.
E. Effort to detach considerations of diversity from overall considerations of
merit.
Traditionally, the evaluation of a faculty applicant or a current faculty member
seeking tenure has been a highly holistic and integrated process, and this is one
of the reasons that such searches largely have been protected from judicial
scrutiny. 343 In contrast, universities such as UC Davis have begun considering
diversity statements as an initial threshold requirement with no other facets of
an application being considered. 344 This exacerbates the risk that applicants will
not be treated as individuals, but will be grouped solely based on their personal
characteristics or viewpoint on the singular topic of diversity. On the other hand,
the single-minded focus on diversity statements actually eliminates the risk of
courts sitting as a “super-tenure” committee, 345 since there is only a single factor
that needs to be evaluated to determine if improper discrimination entered into
the mix.
341. Colleen Flaherty, Cluster-Hiring Cluster &%*#?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 1, 2016 3:00
AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/02/01/uc-riverside-faculty-survey-suggests-out
rage-cluster-hiring-initiative.
342. Id.
343. Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 1984) (listing “the number of factors
considered in tenure decisions” as one reason for being particularly deferential to such decisions
made by universities). The Second Circuit noted that while an “individual’s capacities are
obviously critical”, there are many other complex factors, and indeed such decisions are often made
“in the context of generations of scholarly work in the same area and always against a backdrop of
current scholarship and current reputations of others.” Id. at 92–93. See also Kobrin v. Univ. of
Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 704 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994); Brown v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 346 (1st
Cir. 1989) (quoting Kumar v. Board of Trs., Univ. of Mass., 774 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Courts
must be extremely wary of intruding into the world of university tenure decisions. These decisions
necessarily hinge on subjective judgments regarding the applicant’s academic excellence, teaching
ability, creativity, contributions to the university community, rapport with students and colleagues,
and other factors that are not susceptible of quantitative measurement. Absent discrimination, a
university must be given a free hand in making such tenure decisions.”); Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d
839, 847 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Therefore, unless disparities in curricula vitae are so apparent as virtually
to jump off the page and slap us in the face, we judges should be reluctant to substitute our views
for those of the individuals charged with the evaluation duty by virtue of their own years of
experience and expertise in the field in question. ”).
344. See discussion supra notes 240–45.
345. Villanueva v. Wellesley Coll., 930 F.2d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 1991).
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F. The Loss of Individualized Consideration
Classical liberal approaches to diversity are focused on a holistic evaluation
of an applicant as a discreet individual. 346 One of the “most insidious” aspects
of the loyalty oaths of the 1950s, was that individuals who held to certain
ideologies were screened without any further individualized consideration
whatsoever. 347 For a Marxist who refused to lie or hide his beliefs, there was no
mechanism to attempt to provide nuance or to explain why one’s values were
ultimately compatible with academic life.
The focus on “diversity” in the modern academia has a similar homogenizing
impact. 348 This is particularly true in the hiring context where there is no
meaningful due process or opportunity to contextualize one’s position on
diversity. Indeed, applicants for a faculty position will likely never know that
they were denied a job because of a failing diversity statement. In the UC pilot
model, search committees are not even allowed to access any other part of the
applicant’s file. 349 Even outside of the hiring context, if one is opposed to the
idea of a diversity statement, there is similarly no mechanism for voicing that
concern without being penalized or potentially excluded from consideration.
G. Forced conformity of thought is self-perpetuating
Viewpoint-based discrimination has an inherent danger of being selfreinforcing. As certain ideas are suppressed or excluded from the marketplace
of ideas, those who continue to operate as gatekeepers to entry into that market

346. Avi Woolf, A Conservative Definition of Diversity, JAMES G. MARTIN CTR. FOR ACAD.
RENEWAL (Nov. 29, 2019), https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2019/11/a-conservative-definitionof-diversity/ (“A conservative who values diversity would seek to understand the individual before
him—not discounting immutable parts of their person, but not considering them the whole story,
either.”)
347. See Loyalty Oaths, 77 YALE L. J. 739, 739, 766 (1968). The article discusses how loyalty
oaths violated due process by allowing the legislature:
to render a judicial judgment by isolating one group of people on the basis of their
application for or receipt of a state benefit such as employment, assuming them all
guilty of misconduct, and then punishing them by denying them the benefit if they fail
to remove the taint by swearing to an oath.
Id. at 766.
348. Woolf, supra note 346.
The result of the liberal view of diversity is ironically quite homogenizing—all black
and brown Americans are a hivemind, all gay men and women have (or should have)
the same values, working-class people all have the same interests, and so on. Even
when more subgroups of diversity are created within liberal-approved groups, they
tend to be no less uniform. The old centralizing instinct of modernity, with its exact
formulas and rigid boundaries, is very much in force.
Id.
349. See discussion supra notes 240–45.

Fall 2021]

In the Name of Diversity

571

will be more likely to see those views as illegitimate. That is certainly true in
the academic marketplace of ideas. 350
As such, academic institutions take great pains to avoid allowing ideological
biases to infect the hiring or tenure review processes. As Dean Flier has noted:
During nine years as a medical-school dean, I oversaw nearly a
thousand professorial reviews assessing the research, teaching,
service, and reputation of senior members of the faculty. Maintaining
the objectivity of these reviews is essential to the integrity of the
academy, though I fully recognize the imperfections of the process.
It’s the responsibility of academic leaders to vigorously counter
inappropriate biases and to guard reviews from ideological
interference. This is a surprisingly challenging task, since what
appears objective to one person may look ideological to another. 351
Unfortunately, the way that diversity statements are being evaluated in the
University of California does not guard against “ideological interference” 352
rather, quite the opposite. 353 Diversity statements in parts of the University of
California are expressly being screened based on viewpoints. The use of
diversity statements is designed to ensure that only those who think approvingly
about diversity hiring initiatives are hired. Those hires are, therefore, by design
less likely to see concerns with the process and are more likely to be blind to the
ideological dimensions at work. 354 This ideological screening effect is also
being exacerbated by the fact that many search committees are now being hand
selected based on sympathy with diversity statements and diversity hiring
initiatives. 355
350. Professor Bromwich persuasively argues that academic and institutional norms can often
stifle the exercise of controversial or unpopular ideas, and that the protection of free speech rights
is, therefore, an essential component of the development of robust academic freedom. Bromwich
points to the example of a professor in Israel who spoke out in favor of boycotts for Israel and was
accused of “forefeit[ing] his ability to work effectively within the academic setting.” In such
instances, the First Amendment provides a necessary protection where professional norms of
academic freedom do not or cannot. See Bromwich, supra note 22, at 36–38.
351. Flier, supra note 12.
352. See discussion supra notes 240–45.
353. Those who are invited to join the ranks of the administration are often selected primarily
because they are “uncontroversial” or seen as “team players,” attributes that are particularly
unlikely to lead to the selection of administrators willing to buck the mold and support academic
freedom. Abraham, supra note 318.
354. Ironically, it was once progressive scholars who decried disciplinary heterodoxy when it
was used to devalue the contributions of feminist or critical race scholarship. See Scott, supra note
334, at 462–64. Free speech protections are vital because there is a natural tendency to equate
“respectability and ideological conventionalism,” and to reject “an expression of dissent from the
prevailing doctrines of that disciplines.” Id. at 464 (referencing a 1986 statement by the AAUP).
355. Bromwich, supra note 22, at 39. In such an environment, academic freedom is “helplessly
vulnerable to abuse,” as “the defenders of academic freedom become the keenest inquisitors on
behalf of its restrictions.” Id. “The searches were, for the most part, open-discipline and openrank, and Recruitment Committee members were carefully selected in consultation with the Deans,
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H Greater Scrutiny of Extramural Speech
Unfortunately, there is an alarming trend towards penalizing extramural
speech or expression. For instance, a professor at the University of Oregon was
placed on administrative leave a few years ago for wearing blackface at a
Halloween party she hosted in her home. 356
As discussed above, there is a generalized consensus that consideration of
extramural speech is generally inappropriate and poses serious First Amendment
concerns. 357 Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has noted that punishing or retaliating
against faculty members for their off-campus speech is a particularly pernicious
violation of academic freedom: “[o]f course, campuses must evaluate the quality
of a professor’s teaching or scholarship, which inherently involves assessing
their speech. But universities must not use a professor’s statements in other
settings as a basis for ‘excommunicating’ an otherwise qualified professor.” 358
At the moment, there is not yet evidence that UC is looking beyond the four
corners of the diversity statement when evaluating contributions for diversity.
However, there is a serious danger that, as the use of these statements continues
to evolve, the process will expand to encompass extramural speech as search
committees look through a professor’s social media posts or past publications
attempting to parse out whether a professor is fully on board with diversity
initiatives.
IV. THE NEED FOR MORE ROBUST PROTECTION FOR PROFESSORIAL SPEECH
All of these trends show an increasing need for First Amendment protections
for individual professors. Evaluations have increasingly shifted away from likeminded faculty and toward bureaucrats who are less likely to be sympathetic to
with some additional members added by the Vice Provost, based on their past leadership in
diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives.” UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL REPORT ON THE
2018−2019 USE OF ONE-TIME FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE BEST PRACTICES IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY IN FACULTY EMPLOYMENT, supra note 267, at 20.
356. Eugene Volokh, Opinion: At the University of Oregon, no more free speech for professors
on subjects such as race, religion, sexual orientation, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec.
26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/26/at-the-unive
rsity-of-oregon-no-more-free-speech-for-professors-on-subjects-such-as-race-religion-sexualorientation/; Josh Blackman, The University of Oregon Ducks the First Amendment, JOSH
BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Dec. 24, 2016), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2016/12/24/the-university-oforegon-ducks-the-first-amendment/; Hans Bader, University of Oregon violates free speech in
Halloween costume punishment, LIBERTY UNYIELDING (Dec. 25, 2016), https://libertyunyielding.
com/2016/12/25/university-oregon-violates-free-speech-halloween-costume-punishment/.
357. See supra Section I.C.3. The AAUP has long held that when Professors “speak or write
as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline.” 1940 Statement of
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, AAUP 14, https://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20State
ment.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2021).
358. Howard Gillman & Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion: Professors are losing their freedom of
expression, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/professorsare-losing-their-freedom-of-expression/2017/11/14/c4c7805a-c594-11e7-afe9-4f60b5a6c4a0_
story.html.

Fall 2021]

In the Name of Diversity

573

free speech concerns. Institutional protections such as tenure and peer review
have melted away. Extramural speech is increasingly being scrutinized under
the dangerous theory that exposure to controversial ideas may offend or harm
students who disagree. Review is increasingly segmented, rather than holistic,
in its nature. Ideological conformity is increasingly being portrayed as a virtue
and even a necessity. The requirement that applicants for a faculty position write
a mandatory diversity statement is emblematic of all of these particularly
dangerous trends. In this environment, it is more important than ever that the
First Amendment be utilized as a robust tool to protect academic freedom and
the rights of professors. 359
For the same reasons, it should be clear that the Garcetti test is woefully
inadequate. Under Garcetti, almost anything a professor does or says could be
swept out of First Amendment protection. A professor is hired primarily for
expressive purposes. Teaching, researching, writing, and public speaking
events, such as conferences and symposia, are all part of the job responsibilities
of an academic. 360 All of this speech is under increasing scrutiny by bureaucrats
much more concerned with an ideology of “diversity, equity, and inclusion” than
a commitment to robust freedom of expression.
With regard to diversity statements, there are several reasons why the
application of the Garcetti standard would be particularly inappropriate. First,
to the extent that the statements are an inquiry into a professor’s inner mind, it
cannot be meaningfully said to be the product of one’s employment. Garcetti
should have no place in such an evaluation. Second, in the hiring process what
is being evaluated is likely teaching and scholarly experience that was produced
independently or at another institution. It seems particularly inappropriate to
apply Garcetti to preexisting experiences or writings. Indeed, Pickering may
not even be the right standard to apply to the evaluation of speech that predated
a job application and was independently produced, and more rigorous standards
of review should be applied. 361 Finally, scholars have persuasively argued that
359. Ginsberg, supra note 200, at 135 (“[T]he collective notion of academic freedom might
have been appropriate when applied to, say, a German university, which functioned historically as
a self-governing body of scholars. In the American context, though, universities are governed by
boards and administrators, which may themselves pose a threat to academic freedom.”).
360. Hutchens, et al., supra note 301, at 1042 (“Once an institution elects to empower faculty
to engage in independent speech for purposes of carrying out their professional roles, it should not,
under the First Amendment, then be able to renege on that grant of professional independence based
on the public employee speech cases.”).
361. See Kimberly K. Caster, Burnham v. Ianni: The Eighth Circuit Forges Protection for the
Free Speech Rights of Public University Professors Outside The Pickering-Connick-Waters
Analysis, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 883, 885 (1999). The Ninth Circuit has refused to apply Pickering
to a student applying for admission to a university program that could eventually lead to a teaching
opportunity. See Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit
explained that applying Pickering in that case would “require us to extend this doctrine to those
who do not yet work for the government but may wish to do so—a move we have not yet made.”
Id. at 866. This case is not entirely analogous, since Oyama was a student. However, it shows that
Pickering may not apply in cases where its application would run contrary to the freedom “to
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Garcetti cannot be the test that applies “where the adverse action is claimed to
be a product of impermissible content-based or viewpoint-based
discrimination.” 362
V. PROPOSING A BETTER STANDARD
A. Content v. Viewpoint Discrimination
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that two types of speech
restrictions raise significant constitutional concerns. First, content-based
distinctions that “single[] out specific subject matter for differential
treatment.” 363 Content-based distinctions are frequently suspect because such
restrictions “appl[y] to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the
idea or message expressed[,]” and, therefore, may be wielded “to suppress
disfavored speech.” 364 Viewpoint-based distinctions, or distinctions based on
“‘the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the
speaker’— is a ‘more blatant’ and ‘egregious form of content
discrimination.’” 365
In public forums, which are opened up for expression, content-based
distinctions are treated identically to viewpoint-based distinctions. 366 But when
a forum has not been opened up for generalized expression, the government is
allowed to make content-based distinctions to “reserve the forum for its intended
However, viewpoint-based
purposes, communicative or otherwise.” 367
distinctions are invalid even in such non-public forums because such distinctions
are “an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker’s view.” 368 This is especially important in higher education because
“[o]nly when students and faculty are free to examine all options, no matter how
unpopular or unorthodox, without concern that their careers will be indelibly
marred by daring to think along nonconformist pathways, can we hope to insure
an atmosphere in which intellectual pioneers will develop.” 369
In academic settings, some content distinctions are inevitable and required.
Indeed, some kinds of content distinction help facilitate viewpoint diversity by
ensuring that limited resources are able to create a diverse academic

inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding” that the First Amendment
extends to students. Id. at 863 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)).
362. Tepper & White, supra note 329, at 165.
363. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 169 (2015).
364. Id. at 163, 167.
365. Id. at 168 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829
(1995)).
366. Id. at 169.
367. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
368. Id.
369. Kunda v. Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532, 547 (3d Cir. 1980).
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community. 370 Universities should be able to develop specialized initiatives or
areas of study such as the University of Chicago’s focus on law and economics,
BYU’s focus on law and corpus linguistics, or UCLA Law’s specialization in
critical race studies. 371 These kinds of content distinctions are compatible with
academic freedom and with the First Amendment.
Even still, content-based distinctions must be evaluated to ensure that they are
not being used as a smokescreen or cloak for discrimination based on viewpoint.
At times, the Supreme Court has recognized that what appears to be a contentbased distinction is really a view-point-based distinction in disguise. 372
Viewpoint distinctions must be viewed with significant suspicion for fear of the
suppression of ideas.
An example might be helpful. A university may decide that it wants to hire a
professor with a specialization in early American History.
This is
unquestionably a permissible content-based distinction. On the other hand, a
public university would be on shaky constitutional ground were it to demand
that anyone hired for the position must take the viewpoint that the Founding
Fathers were racists who enacted the Constitution as a tool to perpetuate slavery.
That would be a viewpoint-based or ideology-based classification that should be
subjected to intensive scrutiny to ensure that any such classifications are strictly
necessary to the academic mission of the institution. This is the same standard
that is employed in non-public forums more generally, where content
distinctions are generally permitted, while viewpoint distinctions are forbidden.
But there is also a danger that content-based categorizations may be operated in
such a fashion as to de facto create a viewpoint-based distinction. In this
hypothetical, for instance, a history department that only allowed historians who
specialized in a people’s history of disenfranchised and marginal groups to the
exclusion of any other types of historiography might be using content-based
distinctions as a smokescreen for viewpoint discrimination.
Requiring a diversity statement to be part of an application is a type of contentbased requirement that is likely permissible so long as it serves a legitimate
370. Mac Donald, supra note 253, at 41; Tepper & White, supra note 329, at 166.
371. UNIV. CHICAGO, Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics, https://www.law.uchic
ago.edu/coase-sandor (last visited July 16, 2021); BYU L., https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/ (last visited
July 16, 2021); UCLA L., Critical Race Studies J.D. Specialization, https://law.ucla.edu/acade
mics/degrees/jd-program/specializations/critical-race-studies-jd-specialization (last visited July
16, 2021).
372. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 2234 (2015) (Breyer J., concurring)
There are cases in which the Court has found content discrimination an
unconstitutional method for suppressing a viewpoint. . . . And there are cases where
the Court has found content discrimination to reveal that rules governing a traditional
public forum are, in fact, not a neutral way of fairly managing the forum in the interest
of all speakers.
Justice Breyer cited to several such cases. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1988); Police Dept. of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
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pedagogical purpose. 373 However, because content-based distinctions are being
employed, the evaluation process should be reviewed to make sure that the
process is not being utilized as a tool for viewpoint discrimination.
For instance, professors who engage in research deemed to further “economic
justice” are being rewarded in the University of California. 374 In theory, this
categorization could be employed in a viewpoint neutral fashion. For instance,
if a professor argues that classic free-market economics creates a surplus of
wealth that could benefit all of society and bring more people out of poverty,
then that could be considered promoting “economic justice.” But more likely
that is not how the concept of economic justice is being employed. Likely,
scholarship urging more government intervention in the lives of minorities
would receive credit, while scholarship arguing the contrary position would be
penalized or ignored. So this “content-based” distinction has been transformed
into one that is “view-point based.”
Some of what the UC schools are doing is simply blatant and overt viewpoint
discrimination. As discussed above, any applicant who “[d]efines diversity only
in terms of different areas of study or different nationalities, but doesn’t discuss
gender or ethnicity/race,” any candidate who “[m]ay discount the importance of
diversity” “[m]ay provide reasons for not considering diversity in hiring, or sees
it as antithetical to academic freedom or the university’s research mission,” or
“may state that it’s better not to have outreach or affinity groups aimed at
underrepresented individuals because it keeps them separate from everyone else,
or will make them feel less valued” would get a failing score. 375 That is a clear
cut example of viewpoint-based discrimination that should be subject to strict
and exacting scrutiny.
B. Factors to Evaluate Content-Based Distinctions
As suggested above, careful scrutiny is often necessary to determine whether
a content-based distinction being imposed by a university is viewpoint-based
discrimination in disguise. Based on the prior discussion, here are factors that
courts should take into account when evaluating a content-based distinction
being imposed by a university. 376
373. Erica Goldberg discusses diversity statements in the context of “compelled speech” cases
such as Barnette. Goldberg, supra note 11. This is a plausible line of attack against diversity
statements. But on the other hand, diversity statements are requested as part of an application
process that involves other prompts for writing personal statements. It would be difficult to
distinguish between diversity statements and other requests that are made during the application
process if diversity statements were truly being applied in a viewpoint neutral manner.
374. UCOP Academic Personnel and Programs, Evaluating Contributions to Diversity for
Faculty Appointment and Promotion Under APM – 210, UC SAN DIEGO 1, 4 (Feb. 2017), https://
www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/policies-guidelines/eval-contributions-diversity.pdf.
375. Berkley Rubric, supra note 242 at 1; UCSC Rubric, supra note 243 at 1.
376. These factors could be taken into account as part of the Pickering analysis when weighing
the employee’s speech interest against the employer’s interests. Or perhaps they suggest that a new
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1. How related are the requirements to the job description? –
Universities may of course impose bona fide job requirements on applicants.
For instance, an applicant seeking a position in a school of economics cannot be
aggrieved if he is rejected because he has a degree in psychology or has not
researched or published in economics. These kinds of content-based distinctions
are necessary for creating a high-quality academic community.
But as the diversity statement shows, there is a grave danger when intellectual
homogeneity of thought becomes seen as a universal job requirement.
Those who believe deeply in diversity discourse may argue that the embrace
of diversity is simply a prerequisite for any academic position at an institution
that is institutionally committed to ideas of equity and inclusion. In their mind,
requiring a strong commitment to diversity is as much a prerequisite as the
ability to read or write. As Professor Flier explained, “[o]f course, advocates of
critical race theory and social justice don’t see the pervasive influence of these
ideas as a threat to academic freedom, while those who question them often
do.” 377 But this is always so with diversity oaths of any stripes. Proponents of
anti-communist loyalty oaths were just as certain that communist could not be
effective teachers because of their embrace of what they considered to be a
subversive and dangerous ideology. Or as John Rosenberg put it,
A good measure of how far we’ve come is that our new loyalty oaths,
i.e., diversity statements, are regarded as not only acceptable but
required by those who would react in horror at similar efforts to
promote, say, patriotism or capitalism. Orthodoxy never seems
orthodox to those intent on imposing it. 378
Some critics of diversity statements have taken the extreme opposite stance
that “diversity initiatives . . . have nothing whatever to do with the core mission
of a university: which is intellectual excellence in the pursuit of truth via
teaching and research.” 379 A more nuanced position is certainly possible. One
can acknowledge, for instance, that a university may unquestionably ensure that
every faculty member is willing to treat each and every student with respect. But
one can also recognize that the diversity statements at UC go far beyond that and
impose a requirement that faculty members not only agree with university policy
but zealously embrace the university’s perspective. This requirement is far
removed from any traditional metrics of academic excellence or teaching
performance and detached from any direct job responsibilities, increasing the
risk of discrimination and the suppression of ideas.
test rather than Pickering should instead be developed to more appropriately assess the various
interests in this context.
377. Flier, supra note 12.
378. John Rosenberg, From Diverse Professors to Professors of Diversity, JAMES G. MARTIN
CTR. FOR ACAD. RENEWAL (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2018/12/fromdiverse-professors-to-professors-of-diversity/.
379. John E.R. Staddon, Is Diversity an Enemy of Excellence?, INTELL. TAKEOUT (Feb. 13,
2019), https://www.intellectualtakeout.org/article/diversity-enemy-excellence.
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Or put simply, novel requirements that are not clearly tied to job
responsibilities should be approached with greater suspicion than those
traditional requirements of a profession that are closely linked to job duties. 380
2. Is this a universal requirement for all faculty or a limited requirement for
narrowly crafted faculty positions?
As a closely related matter, there is a difference between a qualification for a
specific discipline or position, and a qualification that applies to all applicants
for all positions writ large. Requiring a certain kind of perspective and expertise
for a narrowly crafted position in a single department would be less likely to risk
suppression of ideas. On the other hand, a broad mandate that all candidates for
all positions must satisfy is much more likely to result in a homogenous faculty
and the suppression of ideas.
The history of loyalty oaths is instructive on this point. The loyalty oaths of
the 1950s were not concerned merely with whether a professor was teaching
classical or Marxian economics in his or her economics classroom. Instead, they
were systematic in their nature and took the form of imputing guilt by mere
association with a set of ideas. 381 A Communist was not merely barred from
teaching economics, but from teaching at all. 382 While either of these policies
would raise serious First Amendment concerns, the total ban was even more
problematic because it excluded anyone who disagreed from the academy
altogether.
Diversity statements at the University of California are akin to the 1950s
loyalty oaths in this respect. A professor who holds classical liberal positions
on diversity issues is not merely barred from teaching a course on sociology or
on the Fourteenth Amendment, but from holding any position in the academy at
all. This restriction applies with as much force to fields that tangentially touch
on diversity policy, such as the hard sciences or engineering, as they do to the
social sciences or humanities. Indeed, it is the hard sciences at UC schools that
appear to be most forcefully embracing the use of diversity statements. 383 The
universal scope of the modern diversity statement is, therefore, one of its more
egregious facets.

380. The Fifth Circuit in Wetherbe suggested that in the hiring context a university should be
particularly free to conduct a broad inquiry and to “screen applicants to ensure that they will
actually perform their duties with maximal diligence.” Wetherbe v. Smith, 593 F. App’x 323, 329
(5th Cir. 2014). But the Court also seemed to acknowledge that how closely related the question
was “to the positon that the applicant is seeking” would make a big difference in how much
deference the institution is due. Id. at 329 n.8. Even though the Fifth Circuit panel erred perhaps
too far on the side of deference in the case, I agree with it that this is a critical consideration for
determining how much deference is appropriate.
381. Loyalty Oaths, supra note 347, at 764.
382. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 489, 496 (1952).
383. See supra note 230, at 3 and accompanying text. Note how many of the pilot programs
are in the hard sciences or disciplines that are seen as more empirical like Mathematics.
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Litmus tests that apply uniformly to all academic positions closely resemble
the anti-communist loyalty oaths and should raise judicial alarm bells
necessitating greater skepticism and scrutiny.
3. Are privately held ideas being evaluated, or only outward conduct?
The idea that a professor may be punished because of his personally held
beliefs rather than his outward conduct is particularly pernicious. After all, “[i]f
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein.” 384
Public universities should be squarely forbidden from considering and
discriminating against privately held beliefs that are not expressed in public.
University search committees are not allowed to be a thought police. Diversity
statements come close to this line by requiring Professors to make an affirmative
ideological pledge and by penalizing anyone not willing to make that pledge.
Silence or indifference is an inadequate response as full intellectual assent is
required. These kinds of requirements should be scrutinized particularly strictly.
Similarly pernicious is the effort to equate the expression of ideas with
discriminatory conduct. The example of Richard Sander, a Professor at UCLA
law, is instructive. Sander is a well-known critic of affirmative action programs
and an advocate for the theory of mismatch (the theory that affirmative action
harms minority students by placing them in schools that do not match their skills,
therefore, setting them up for failure). As a result, minority students in the law
program erupted at perceived slights, such as Sander’s first-year property law
class printing t-shirts with his name on them for a softball competition. Some
students also complained that they might not feel comfortable seeking help from
Sander because they would not want to confirm his research regarding
mismatch. 385 Supporters of diversity programs might point to Sander as proof
that a professor who is not personally committed to diversity outreach programs
may not be capable to teaching a diverse mixture of students.
Accepting this premise is insulting to the intelligence and capability of
students at schools like UCLA Law. There are no indicators that Sander ever
discriminated against a single student or treated a single student in an inferior
fashion as a result of race. Accordingly, those who support excluding professors
like Sander must embrace one of two claims, which are both dangerous to
academic freedom and the First Amendment.
First, students cannot be expected to distinguish between an empirically based
theory that has received recognition from members of the Supreme Court 386 and
384. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
385. See Mac Donald, supra note 253 at 72.
386. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 372 (2003) (Thomas J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Law School tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a
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outright racism. Second, students cannot be expected to learn from a professor
with whom they disagree sharply.
With regard to the first claim, equating serious academic theories with
outright racism is corrosive to intellectual diversity on campus and in the public
square. Students are, of course, free to disagree with Professor Sander and
debate the merits of his theory. But disagreement, even heated disagreement, is
not equal to racial harassment or hatred. The university, a place committed to
the pursuit of truth, is precisely where such narrow-minded thinking should be
confronted and rejected.
The second claim is empirically unfounded, as black students in Professor
Sander’s property section have actually performed better than students in other
first-year sections. 387 Moreover, it once again betrays a fundamental
misunderstanding of the purpose of higher education as a place where students
are exposed to a diversity of perspectives and given the opportunity to think,
reason, and learn.
The example of Richard Sander shows that university officials may attempt
to argue that certain viewpoints regarding diversity programs must be excluded
because their presence in the academy will cause offense, prejudice, and lead
minority students to feel unsafe or insecure. As Professor Eugene Volokh has
argued, “if accepted, these arguments really will be the end of freedom of
expression—both casual and more formally academic—on university
professors’ part[.]” 388 Embracing this kind of thinking will create a “student’s
veto” akin to the “heckler’s veto” that has been repeatedly rejected by the
Supreme Court and lower courts. 389 Even under the Pickering test, courts have
University of Michigan degree and all of the opportunities that it offers. These overmatched
students take the bait, only to find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition. And
this mismatch crisis is not restricted to elite institutions.”); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570
U.S. 297, 333, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2432, 186 L. Ed. 2d 474 (2013) (Scalia J., concurring)
(“Furthermore, the University’s discrimination does nothing to increase the number of blacks and
Hispanics who have access to a college education generally. Instead, the University’s
discrimination has a pervasive shifting effect. See T. Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World
145–146 (2004). The University admits minorities who otherwise would have attended less
selective colleges where they would have been more evenly matched. But, as a result of the
mismatching, many blacks and Hispanics who likely would have excelled at less elite schools are
placed in a position where underperformance is all but inevitable because they are less academically
prepared than the white and Asian students with whom they must compete. Setting aside the
damage wreaked upon the self-confidence of these overmatched students, there is no evidence that
they learn more at the University than they would have learned at other schools for which they were
better prepared. Indeed, they may learn less.”)
387. Id. at 73−74.
388. Eugene Volokh, Silencing professor speech to prevent students from being offended – or
from fearing discrimination by the professors, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 30,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/30/silencingprofessor-speech-to-prevent-students-from-being-offended-or-from-fearing-discrimination-bythe-professors/.
389. See Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 142 (1992) (Rehnquist J.,
dissenting) (criticizing a decision for “resulting in the kind of ‘heckler’s veto’ we have previously
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held that “threatened disruption by others reacting to public employee speech
simply may not be allowed to serve as justification for public employer
disciplinary action directed at that speech.” 390 That protection against a
heckler’s veto is even more vital in academia, which has served as an incubator
for unpopular or controversial ideas. 391
In Rodriguez v. Maricopa County Community College District, the Ninth
Circuit rejected a racial harassment claim brought by students against a college
that failed to discipline a professor who wrote emails to an employee list server
extolling the virtue of white culture and critiquing multiculturalism and
diversity. 392 The Court discussed how “[f]ree speech has been a powerful
force for the spread of equality under the law” and “we must not squelch that
freedom because it may also be harnessed by those who promote retrograde or
unattractive ways of thought.” 393 Accordingly, the Court emphasized that not
only was the University not required to punish the professor, but also it could
not do so, because his “speech would be singled out for suppression because of
his disfavored opinions on those issues.” 394 The Court emphasized that
“listeners who are offended by the ideas being discussed certainly are not
entitled to shut down an entire forum simply because they object to what some
people are saying” because otherwise, “very soon no one would be able to say
much of anything at all.” 395
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez is correct. The First Amendment
has always stood for the principle that the proper response to controversial ideas
is counter speech rather than suppression or coercion. Academic institutions
must resist the tendency to equate offensive speech with harassment or the
creation of an unsafe academic environment, because this equivalency will result
in the destruction of meaningful First Amendment protections. Courts must be
particularly vigilant in rejecting attempts to offer this kind of false equivalency.

condemned”); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, 237–38 (1963); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949). See also Daniel Ortner, The Terrorist’s Veto: Why the First
Amendment Must Protect Provocative Portrayals of the Prophet Muhammad, 12 NW. J. L. & SOC.
POL’Y. 1, 31–32 (2016) (discussing how courts have protected provocative speech against a
heckler’s veto in order to prevent viewpoint discrimination against those views that are
controversial enough to provoke a heated response).
390. Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985). See also Flanagan v. Munger,
890 F. 2d 1557, 1566 (10th Cir. 1989) (“The department cannot justify disciplinary action against
plaintiffs simply because some members of the public find plaintiffs’ speech offensive and for that
reason may not cooperate with law enforcement officers in the future.”); Dible v. City of Chandler,
515 F.3d 918, 934 (9th Cir. 2008) (Canby J., concurring).
391. Blackman, supra note 356.
392. Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 705−06 (9th Cir. 2010).
393. Id. at 709–10.
394. Id. at 710–11.
395. Id. at 711.
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Policies targeting internal thought or extramural speech should be scrutinized
with particular rigor. Courts must reject any encroachment of the heckler’s veto
into academia.
4. Are the criterion being employed widely held and reliably applicable?
When the criterion for evaluating scholarship are widely held and objectively
applied, it reduces the risk of subjectivity and viewpoint discrimination. For
instance, consider a professor who embraced the universally discredited theory
that the Holocaust did not occur. An institution that would exclude such a
professor would have recourse to “the disciplinary protocols of history
departments”, which could be brought to bear to show why the Holocaust denial
scholarship was defective or invalid. 396 These same norms could be applied to
future applicants in a consistent and verifiable fashion. Those norms would also
remain subject to criticism or revision if new information came to light. Other
objective measures could also be utilized, such as the placement of academic
publications or the reviews that a publication has received from peers. The
utilization of such objective professional norms helps insulate academic review
from the risk of viewpoint discrimination. 397 While academic norms are
certainly not entirely free from the bias, they are a vital protection for academic
freedom and free speech rights.
In contrast, there are no meaningful institutional norms that can be brought to
bear to evaluate something like a mandatory diversity statement. 398
As Dean Flier explained:
Most in the academic community, including myself, see efforts toward
greater diversity and inclusion as essential to the core commitments of
a humane and liberal society, such as eliminating inappropriate
barriers, creating equal opportunity, and displaying tolerance and
respect for group differences. But the key terms — diversity, equity,
and inclusion — are rarely defined with specificity, and their meaning
has been subtly shifting. That’s a serious problem, especially if
diversity efforts are to be a criterion for faculty evaluation. The term
“equity,” for instance, can imply equality of opportunity or equality of
outcome — two quite different things with distinct policy
implications. The concept of “inclusion” might imply the welcoming
of diverse groups and perspectives, or it might involve the avoidance
396. Bérubé, supra note 101.
397. See Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that universities must be allowed to use “lawful criteria” for evaluation but that this
criteria “can be examined for an impermissible discriminatory use”); See also Joseph J. Martins,
supra note 160 ) (analyzing Adams).
398. Samia E. McCall, Thinking Outside of the Race Boxes: A Two-Pronged Approach to
Further Diversity and Decrease Bias, 2018 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 23, 58 (2018) (“The reading and
scoring of a diversity statement is subject to the bias, both implicit and explicit, of the admissions
committees.”).
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of microaggressions and the creation of safe spaces — two
controversial goals. The lack of definitional clarity of key terms
creates confusion, suspicion, and disagreement. 399
This “confusion, suspicion, and disagreement” is exacerbated by the fact that
terms like “equity” or “diversity” may mean very different things in different
academic disciplines. Therefore, attempting to craft a single objective and
overarching definition for terms like “diversity, equity, and inclusion” is likely
to be elusive. This means that there is a lot more room for subjectivity and
viewpoint bias to infect the process. There is also, somewhat ironically, concern
that because notions of diversity, equity, and inclusion vary between cultures
that the use of mandatory diversity statements will prejudice international
scholars.
When universities utilize criterion that are highly subjective and are not
subject to institutional and professional norms, their determinations should be
treated with greater suspicion.
5. Is the review holistic or a threshold test?
As already discussed, holistic review minimizes the risk that viewpoint is used
as a predominant factor in consideration. 400 The presence of holistic review may
also be constitutionally significant.
In Bakke, the Supreme Court invalidated UC’s affirmative action program
because of “its disregard of individual rights” and the lack of individualized
holistic consideration. 401 Although diversity statements do not utilize quotas or
caps, there is something quite similar at work when a university prioritizes a
contribution to diversity to the exclusion of other factors as UC schools have
done in their diversity pilot programs. No matter what else an applicant could
bring to the university community, be it brilliant academic insight, award
winning teaching experience, or dedicated university service, it will not be
enough to outweigh the lack of a conforming diversity statement. The
University of California may ignore “the next Albert Einstein or Jonas Salk” if
he fails to parrot the diversity orthodoxy. 402
Defenders of the diversity statement may argue that evaluation of the diversity
statement is in and of itself holistic with a variety of factors, such as teaching
and research, being considered. But that does not change the fact that a professor
who prioritized academics or teaching rather than diversity efforts because she
believes that the university’s diversity efforts are harmful may not be considered
at all regardless of merit.
399. Flier, supra note 12.
400. See discussion supra Section III.F.
401. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978).
402. Ortner, supra note 12. See also Heather Mac Donald, Op-Ed: UCLA’s Infatuation With
Diversity is a Costly Diversion from its True Mission, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.la
times.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mac-donald-diversity-ucla-20180902-story.html.
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Holistic consideration of a candidate minimizes the risk that any single item
will be taken as a litmus test, while a single-focused review raises concerns about
an intellectual inquisition.
6. Who is doing the evaluation, faculty, or administrators?
In the Supreme Court’s academic freedom precedent described above, many
of its cases involved academic institutions being buffeted by administrative
forces, such as school boards. In this context, it made sense to speak about the
academic freedom rights of academic institutions. After all, it was reasonable
to assume that academic institutions would be far more solicitous of academic
freedom rights and of the First Amendment than faceless government
bureaucrats who were largely detached from the academy. 403 When professional
academics are in charge, it is far more likely that they will impose the objective
and professional standards of their profession in evaluating applicants. 404
As the professionalization and bureaucratization of the academy continues
apace, it may no longer make sense to think about the administration of a
university as being an ally for faculty academic freedom. 405 To the contrary,
these diversity bureaucrats and other administrative officials more fully
resemble the school board officials who were time and again rebuked by the
Supreme Court in their efforts to stifle academic freedom. 406
Accordingly, Courts should consider treating policies that are being primarily
pushed by bureaucrats and other non-academics with far more skepticism than
they traditionally have treated faculty policies and procedures.
403. See Pomona Coll. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 667–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
Only one group of people is suited to undertake the responsibility of making these
decisions: the candidate’s academic peers who are knowledgeable about the
candidate’s chosen field of study and about the particular needs of the institution.
These peers, unlike non-academics, are equipped to evaluate the candidate’s teaching
and research according to their conformity with methodological principles agreed upon
by the entire academic community. They also have the knowledge to meaningfully
evaluate the candidate’s contributions within his or her particular field of study as well
as the relevance of those contributions to the goals of the particular institution.
Moreover, because their individual academic reputations are intertwined with that of
the university, the candidate’s peers have the greatest stake in choosing people whose
future work will reflect favorably on the institution.
404. See supra Sections III.C & III.D.
405. Ginsberg, supra note 200, at 135 (“[T]he collective notion of academic freedom might
have been appropriate when applied to, say, a German university, which functioned historically as
a self-governing body of scholars. In the American context, though, universities are governed by
boards and administrators, which may themselves pose a threat to academic freedom.”).
406. Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: O Say, Does
That Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet Wave?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1993)
(criticizing the tendency to take the Court’s language regarding academic freedom “out of context
. . . to imply that universities themselves, or their administrative officials, have a right to ‘academic
freedom’ that courts should respect even when such officials’ authority is exercised to the detriment
of the interests of mere ‘faculty,’ including faculty interests in academic freedom.”).
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7. Is the application of the standard likely to stifle or suppress the diversity
of thought on the faculty and on campus?
All of the aforementioned factors point to this overarching question: is the
application of a particular content or viewpoint-based standard likely to stifle or
suppress diversity of thought on the faculty and on campus? Stifling diversity
of thought is particularly likely when viewpoint discrimination is involved. It is
also more likely when review is based on factors far removed from core job
performance requirements, is applied to all positions indiscriminately, involves
the evaluation of thought and ideas rather than conduct, is not based on objective
disciplinary norms, is singularly focused rather than holistic in nature, and is
applied by bureaucrats who are especially unlikely to be protective of freedom
of thought and expression.
All of these factors are present in the case of how the University of California
is utilizing mandatory diversity statements. Accordingly, these statements are
particularly dangerous to diversity of thought and freedom of expression in the
academy. Accordingly, Courts should closely scrutinize these diversity
statements and require universities to offer a compelling and narrowly tailored
justification for requiring applicants to complete such statements. 407

407. It is highly unlikely that a university will succeed in providing adequate support for
justifying such programs. Diversity in higher education has been deemed a compelling interest,
but the Court has rejected that rationale in other contexts such as in secondary education. Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).724–725, 730 (plurality
opinion). While the university clearly has an interest in ensuring that diverse students are
welcomed, it can likely achieve that goal in more rights protective ways, such as punishing
professors who discriminate against students based on protected characteristics. An overarching
system of content and viewpoint discrimination is not even close to a narrowly tailored solution.
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APPENDIX A: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, OFFICE OF THE VICE
PROVOST – ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, ORIENTATION PRESENTATION POWERPOINT
(JAN. 2019) 408

ADVANCING FACULTY DIVERSITY
ORIENTATION FOR
SEARCH COMMITTEE MEMBERS
JANUARY2019
OFFICE OFTHEVICE PROVOST –ACADEMICAFFAIRS

AGENDA
 Overview and goals of these searches (VP Kass)
 A discussion with STEAD (STEAD members)
 Search Committee Expectations andTimeline (VP Kass)
 Rubrics (AVPPickett)
 Discussion/Q&A

408. Reprinted with the permission of the University of California, Davis.
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OVERVIEW AND GOALS
 The call from UCOP – a URM initiative
 Goals of this search process
 Funds are from the State Legislature
 Constraints (time and otherwise)
 Use of Contributions to Diversity Statements first
 The publicity receivedso far (example next slide)
 UCR’ssuccess (example in two slides)

“So now they are literally saying that research and scholarship is
less important to the mission of a university than "diversity" is.”
“In essence this program is a racial quota program and so illegal
under California law.The main criteria for selection is your race.”
“Requiring such statements in applications for appointments and
promotions is an affront to academic freedom,and diminishes the
true value of diversity,equity of inclusion by trivializing it.”
“As part of coming to your view that diversity statements
trivialize diversity,did you listen to STEM PoC,women,LGBTQ
voices? Because they don't seem to agree with you.”
“… how does a statement describing ones efforts towards
diversity affect academic freedom? I also had to make statements
about my teaching philosophy and research approach for tenure
and my freedom survived.”
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UC RIVERSIDE: EXPERIENCE WITH THEIR COLLEGE OF
ENGINEERING

A DISCUSSIONWITH STEAD

[Vol. 70:515
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EXPECTATIONS OF SEARCH COMMITTEE MEMBERS
 Doing more than the usual
 Right now – need to nail down our advertising priorities
 Need members to use their free listserves to get the word out
 Need members to develop lists of names of URM individuals and contact them
 Serve as ambassadors for this process
 Renaming excellence
 Valuing contributions to diversity,why this matters
 Legally consistent with Proposition 209

TIMELINE & PROCESS
 Plan to post these positions by January 15,open through Feb 15.
 Between now and Feb.15,Committees can work on finalizing their rubrics for

evaluating the Contributions to Diversity Statements (CDS).

 Starting February 16,Committees will initially only be provided with all candidates’

CDS for review.Committees should be meeting by the end of February.

 Following this review,Committees will meet in person to consider who is on the

“Seriously Consider” list,possible Skype interviews,come up with a Shortlist.

 Interviews should occur in March,by mid-March.
 Deans should be working on a list of who should be meeting the candidates during

the campus visit.
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TIMELINE & PROCESS (CONTINUED)
 Confidential advisors (2) – completely separate from the process,and available to all

candidates who are invited to campus. One from sciences (for CAES, CBS, ENG,
VET),one from social sciences/humanities(for GSM,SOE,LAW).

 After final interviews, we will build in time for faculty to provide feedback to the

Committee. Committee provides their feedback to the dean. (For those
schools/colleges with departments,the dean will work with departments to consider
placement.Dean and selected department/chair need to be strong advocates.)

 April – Dean begins negotiations with the top candidate.
 AcademicAffairs will assist with admin support and working closely with deans

offices.

ASSESSING CONTRIBUTIONS
TO DIVERSITY STATEMENTS
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HOW DOES THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DEFINE “DIVERSITY?”
 TheAcademic Senate adopted in 2009 the following broad definition of diversity:

Diversity - features of California past, present and future refers to a variety of
personal experiences,values,and worldviews that arise from differences of culture
and circumstance. Such differences include race, ethnicity,gender,age, religion,
language, abilities/disabilities, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, geographic
region and more.

PURPOSE OF THE DIVERSITY STATEMENT:

•Underscores campus role as a public land grant research
university serving residents of the state.
•Aligns with academic personnel policy to encourage and
recognize faculty contributions to diversity.
•Reinforces campus strategic goal of increasing faculty
participation in diversity,equity,and inclusion activities.
•Communicates inclusive excellence as a faculty
expectation for all applicants.
•Complements researchand teaching interests of
applicants and augments skills and competencies.
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IS THE DIVERSITY STATEMENT CONSISTENT WITH UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA POLICY?

 Yes.
APM 210.1-d which governs appointment, appraisaland promotion, recommends
that faculty be both encouraged and rewarded for activity that promotes inclusive
excellence:
“The University of California is committed to excellence and equity in every facet of its
mission.Teaching,research, professional and public service contributions that promote
diversity and equal opportunity are to be encouraged and given recognition in the
evaluation of the candidate's qualifications. These contributions to diversity and
equal opportunity can take a variety of forms including efforts to advance
equitable access to education, public service that addresses the needs of
California's diverse population, or research in a scholar's area of expertise
that highlights inequities.”

WHAT SHOULD A DIVERSITY STATEMENTACCOMPLISH?

 Indicate awareness of inequitiesand challenges in

education faced by historically underrepresentedor
economically disadvantaged groups, and the negative
consequencesof underutilization

 Demonstrate a trackrecord and measure of

success in activities (such as mentoring, teaching or
outreach) that aim to reduce barriers in education or
research for underrepresentedor economically
disadvantaged groups

 Describe specific plans to contribute
through

campus programs,new activities,or throughnational
or off-campus organizations
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STRONGVS.WEAK STATEMENTS
Strong statements:

Weak statements:



Tend to be substantial in length (e.g.,2 - 3 pages)



Tend to be brief in length



Clearly address all three criteria: Understanding,track record,
and plans



Are often vague (e.g.,“diversity is important for the success
of science”)



Demonstrate sophisticated thinking about the
underrepresentation of groups in academia and structural
barriers to success (e.g., racism, sexism, homophobia,etc.)



Describe participating in few activities



Participated only peripherally in activities



Provide detailed information about activities, including their
specific role in the activity and the outcomes



Show only a simplistic understanding of equity and inclusion
issues



Typicallycontain descriptions of multiple efforts rather than
only one or two





Have an established track record going back many years

Describe efforts to be undertaken that are generally
already expected of faculty (e.g., being welcoming to all
students, making the classroom a positive environment,
having women among advisees, etc)



Provide clear and convincing evidence of how they would
contribute at UC Davis





Reference activities or programs currently taking place at UC
Davis and how they would become involved or fill other needs

Expecting UC Davis to provide opportunities for the
candidate to get involved rather than proposing activities
or programs

TIPS FOR SEARCH COMMITTEES
 Make sure you have considered how much weight your committee wants to assign to a candidate’sknowledge

of,experience with,and/or commitment to diversity,equity,and inclusion in relation to other areas.
 When reviewing statements,notice candidates’ level of reliance on generalities,platitudes,and clichés.

Are their statements generic and perfunctory,or more detailed and specific to the individual?

 Notice whether candidates describe concrete experiences—working in a specific outreach program in a

specific community,serving as aTAor instructor in a specific course,tutoring diverse students in a particular
summer program,conductingfield research in a particular community,and so on.

 Also notice the level of candidates’ commitments—how often have they been involved in these types of

opportunities,and/or how long have they worked in particular areas?

 If candidates have not had many opportunities to work in these areas in the past, can they describe their

potential for future contributions to diversity and inclusion in concrete and specific detail?

 Return to your assessment rubric:how well do candidates’ experiences,aspirations,and potential match up

with your required or preferred qualities?
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A SAMPLE RUBRIC: UC IRVINE

SAMPLE STATEMENT#1

[Vol. 70:515
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SAMPLE STATEMENT#2

SAMPLE STATEMENT#3
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USING STATEMENTSAS PART OF OVERALL EVALUATION
 Consider creating a cut-off score for advancing

equity and inclusion,below which a candidate would
not move forward in the search process (would be
considered“below the bar”),regardless of their
scores in other areas,similar to what would be
done for researchquality or plans.

 Set a high bar.

[Vol. 70:515
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ADDITIONAL RESOURCES
These are included in your packet:
 Guidance from UCOP on evaluating Contributions to Diversity Statements:

http://facultydiversity.ucsd.edu/recruitment/C2D%20Guidelines_UCOP.pdf

 UC Irvine Evaluation Grid:

http://archive.advance.uci.edu/Advance/ADVANCE%20PDFs/DiversityEval.xlsx

 UC Berkeley Rubric:

https://ofew.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/rubric_to_assess_candidate_contributions_to_div
ersity_equity_and_inclusion.pdf
 UC DavisAcademicAffairs:
https://academicaffairs.ucdavis.edu/faculty-equity-and-inclusion

DISCUSSION/QUESTIONS
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